Winning the war at home: stability operations strategy for homeland security by Shaughnessy, Joshua
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-03
Winning the war at home: stability operations
strategy for homeland security
Shaughnessy, Joshua














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
WINNING THE WAR AT HOME: STABILITY 









Thesis Advisor:  Stanley Supinski 
Co-Advisor: Patrick Miller 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time 
for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing 
and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, 
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-
4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
WINNING THE WAR AT HOME: STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY 
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Joshua Shaughnessy
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 










11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol 
number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
While much progress has been made in American homeland security, there remains a lack of
strategic consensus for state and local agencies. Communities are increasingly outspoken in 
their expectations of unified homeland security efforts. Remarkably, the U.S. military has a long 
history of using stability operations strategy to execute similar missions in foreign and domestic 
settings. Stability operations strategy is a non-traditional U.S. military approach emphasizing 
community collaboration to restore order. Despite similar objectives, stability operations strategy 
and its use of civil affairs forces do not appear to have been studied as a possible model to unify 
state and local homeland security activities. 
This research uses a case study and policy options analysis to explore the questions: Is 
the U.S. military's stability operations strategy a useful consideration for domestic 
homeland security applications? If so, how could military stability operations strategy be 
implemented in homeland security efforts? 
The research recommends adopting the strategy and organizing state and local homeland 
security initiatives into six stabilization sectors: civil security, civil control, essential services, 
support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and information 
management. Stability operations strategy offers state and local decision makers a 
comprehensive, community-focused model for homeland security initiatives. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18
ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
WINNING THE WAR AT HOME: STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
Joshua Shaughnessy 
Sergeant, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department 
B.S., Indiana University, 2000 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2016 





Associate Chair of Instruction, 
Department of National Security Affairs 
iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
v 
ABSTRACT 
While much progress has been made in American homeland security, 
there remains a lack of strategic consensus for state and local agencies. 
Communities are increasingly outspoken in their expectations of unified 
homeland security efforts. Remarkably, the U.S. military has a long history of 
using stability operations strategy to execute similar missions in foreign and 
domestic settings. Stability operations strategy is a non-traditional U.S. military 
approach emphasizing community collaboration to restore order. Despite similar 
objectives, stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs forces do not 
appear to have been studied as a possible model to unify state and local 
homeland security activities. 
This research uses a case study and policy options analysis to explore the 
questions: Is the U.S. military’s stability operations strategy a useful 
consideration for domestic homeland security applications? If so, how could 
military stability operations strategy be implemented in homeland security 
efforts? 
The research recommends adopting the strategy and organizing state and 
local homeland security initiatives into six stabilization sectors: civil security, civil 
control, essential services, support to governance, support to economic and 
infrastructure development, and information management. Stability operations 
strategy offers state and local decision makers a comprehensive, community-
focused model for homeland security initiatives. 
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State and local jurisdictions have been challenged to develop 
comprehensive homeland security strategies. While progress has been made 
since 9/11, many improvements have centered on disaster prevention and 
response. Other areas of homeland security lack consensus in methodology, and 
leaders employ a wide variety of methods to protect citizens. 
Perhaps homeland security agencies need not reinvent the wheel. The 
U.S. military has developed a formal methodology for stabilizing foreign 
environments across the range of conflict. Stability operations strategy is unique 
in military strategy, as it emphasizes collaboration with community stakeholders 
to restore order. The strategy provides a framework for balancing conventional 
military power with cooperative initiatives. Stability operations strategy has been 
examined throughout numerous foreign deployments, and is designed to address 
systemic issues with a long-term commitment of resources. Given these traits, 
stability operations strategy can be a useful approach toward unifying homeland 
security initiatives. 
According to the U.S. Army’s stability operations field manual, the strategy 
is designed to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil, government, and 
military operations.1 The military uses civil affairs personnel to execute 
stabilization strategy. Their job can be described as armed social work—building 
relationships with public and private stakeholders to achieve stability objectives. 
The U.S. Army’s civil affairs field manual also describes its suitability for 
supporting domestic authorities within the United States.2 Indeed, contemporary 
homeland security efforts demonstrate significant civil-military collaboration in 
supporting domestic authorities. Given this precedent and the desire for 
                                            
1 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, October 2008), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.  
2 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, October 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.  
 xviii 
community-focused policies, civil affairs’ execution of stability operations strategy 
is most relevant for homeland security consideration. 
The pursuit of domestic tranquility is undoubtedly complex. Stability 
operations strategy suggests organizing homeland security efforts toward 
specific objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of 
law, and security interests. Civil affairs’ twelve principles of joint operations also 
provide a strategic guide for state and local homeland security initiatives: 
1. Objective: ensure stakeholders share a clearly defined and 
attainable purpose supporting primary stability tasks. 
2. Offensive: maintain the initiative toward addressing systemic 
issues. 
3. Mass: leverage the benefits of collective capability from a wider 
spectrum of resources. 
4. Economy of force: prioritize resources toward key objectives, with 
fewer assets dedicated to secondary efforts. 
5. Maneuver: shift collaborative resources to support homeland 
security objectives.  
6. Unity of command: for every activity, ensure a clearly defined 
organizational command structure. 
7. Security: prevention efforts should prepare for the unexpected, and 
respond to critical incidents. 
8. Surprise: be creatively proactive in protecting and engaging the 
public. 
9. Simplicity: stability operations strategy for homeland security should 
be clear and uncomplicated. 
10. Perseverance: ensure practitioners have the commitment 
necessary to achieve homeland security objectives. 
11. Legitimacy: develop rapport with the community to help maintain 
stable neighborhoods. 
 xix 
12. Restraint: emphasize institutional patience, and balance use of 
force with soft power strategies.3 
Some communities do not feel their government responds adequately to their 
needs. In these cases, the twelve principles may provide some clarity for 
evaluating existing methods. Many jurisdictions continue to search for a strategy 
to unify homeland security efforts and meet public expectations. Leaders should 
innovate and adapt existing models rather than invent anew. 
Stability operations strategy provides a reasonable blueprint for organizing 
collaborative homeland security efforts into six primary stability task sectors: civil 
security, civil control, essential services, support to governance, support to 
economic and infrastructure development, and information management. One 
example of this concept is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
                                            
3 These are adapted from the twelve principles of joint operations found in Department of the 
Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-11. 
 xx 
Figure 1. Stability Lines of Effort for Homeland Security 
 
Adapted from Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 




Current approaches to homeland security should be improved. Given 
these demands, stability operations strategy offers a template for engaging 
communities and developing partnerships for homeland security initiatives. 
Particularly given continued trends toward civil-military collaboration, the 
commonalities between stability operations strategy and homeland security 
initiatives are worth considering in state and local jurisdictions. 
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Stability operations strategy is a non-traditional military approach that 
utilizes its assets to restore order and maintain stability. The strategy emphasizes 
collaboration with civilian stakeholders to achieve regional stability.1 Historically, 
the military has executed this strategy through civil affairs units to establish 
security, build trust with local populations, and transition to civil governance.2 
Despite extensive use during international deployments, stability operations 
strategy and its civil affairs elements have not been considered as a possible 
model for American homeland security efforts. The objective of this research is to 
conduct a comparative policy analysis and consider stability operations as an 
alternative strategy for organizing homeland security efforts. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis primarily utilizes a predictive paradigm to explore the following 
research questions: 
1. Is the U.S. military’s stability operations strategy a useful 
consideration for domestic homeland security applications? 
2. If so, how could military stability operations strategy be 
implemented in homeland security efforts? 
This author expected to find the military stability operations strategy useful 
for consideration in domestic homeland security efforts. Specifically, the author 
believes the strategic approach may provide a framework for public-private 
collaboration based upon community-focused stability objectives. Operational 
elements of stabilization strategy such as civil affairs may be particularly 
                                            
1 The term “stability operations” has been resurrected in 21st-century U.S. military literature. 
The vernacular was perhaps first used in the 1967 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-23, Stability 
Operations, but fell into relative disuse during subsequent decades of military lexicon. 
2 Although the term “civil affairs” appears to predate formal references to “stability 
operations,” civil affairs forces were historically used in a manner consistent with contemporary 
stability operations strategy. 
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advantageous to compare with homeland security applications such as law 
enforcement. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite notable contrasts, stability operations and civil affairs share some 
common traits with domestic efforts to stabilize the American homeland. Many of 
these tactics, such as community engagement and infrastructure development, 
are key to ensuring domestic security, but often fail to be fully integrated into 
homeland security strategies. This thesis studies military applications of stability 
operations strategy, the execution of that strategy by civil affairs assets, and the 
potential applications of those models in homeland security initiatives. 
While the lack of prior research on this topic presents some limitations, it 
also affords opportunity for novel research. Existing research has examined the 
military’s use of stability operations and civil affairs abroad, and additional data 
has been collected on similar homeland security topics. Despite some 
comparable similarities, this author has not identified significant research that 
examines the topics in the same context. The outcomes of this research are 
uncharted and provide an important opportunity for graduate-level study on an 
unexplored homeland security topic. 
The primary audience for this research is state and local homeland 
security executives and policy decision-makers. For example, a city manager or 
mayor could use military stability operations strategy as a framework to integrate 
homeland security efforts in his or her jurisdiction. Within the context of stability 
operations, civil affairs may also provide a model to direct law enforcement or 
other homeland security efforts on community-focused objectives. These 
concepts may provide some clarity to existing “whole community” efforts 
designed to provide a comprehensive, mission-focused plan for domestic 
 3 
homeland security operations.3 Based upon initial research, this author believes 
stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs offer a unique approach for 
state and local agencies to unify homeland security efforts under a 
comprehensive methodology.4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Stability Operations Strategy 
The term “stability operations” evolved from refinements in earlier broad 
concepts of “military operations other than war.”5 Military manuals and doctrine 
shed light on strategic intentions, while other sources offer a more critical 
examination of particular aspects of stability operations or strategy. The concept 
of stability operations encompasses specific elements (such as civil affairs), 
which are used to reach defined goals. Objectives for stability operations are 
customized to the needs of local communities.6 Case studies or examinations of 
stability operations often focus on specific phases in which the strategy is 
applied, such as a pre- or post-conflict environment. Figure 1 illustrates military 
literature’s differentiation between stability operations and other types of military 
strategy. 
                                            
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 
2011–2014 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2011), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-3227/
fema_2011___2014_strategic_plan.pdf.  
4 Harry Lewis Coles and Albert Katz Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1964), 86. 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (Joint Publication 
3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995). 
6 James A. Russell, “Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan,” in 
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, eds. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 54. 
4 
Figure 1.  Examples of Military Operations 
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2011), I-15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. 
In the broader set of military plans, stability operations strategy is unique 
in its focus on local issues. Assessments of stability operations often attribute 
increased efficiencies and effectiveness to its community-oriented emphasis.7 
However, some of the same sources note complications from the strategy’s 
dependence on consensus-building. Stability operations strategy relies on a 
coordinated effort across multinational or interagency coalitions, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteers. Given the 
challenging relationship dynamics between these parties, some experts contend 
that a military organization is not the ideal model from which to develop 
consensus.8 
These more skeptical assessments offer some insight in the suitability of 
stability operations for domestic application. For example, the administration of 
stability operations may be less ideal for the type of paramilitary design of many 
homeland security agencies, such as fire and police departments. Some 
literature argues that stability operations’ holistic, consensus-building emphasis is 
better administered in a non-traditional, decentralized command structure.9 
7 Jeffrey M. Shanahan, “Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly 79 (4th quarter, 2015): 28. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/
jfq-79/jfq-79_27-35_Shanahan.pdf. 
8 Davis S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 14. 
9 Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements, 14. 
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Certainly, atypical aspects of military stability operations strategy reflect this 
concept through partnership with the Department of State and its emphasis on 
diplomacy and negotiation. In any case, stability operations literature 
underscores the importance of a planning framework that is flexible to community 
needs. The implications of these ideas on domestic implementation are explored 
in this research. 
2. Civil Affairs 
Within this research, civil affairs practices are an intriguing component of 
stability operations that share similar goals and functionalities with many 
homeland security agencies. After all, many local and state governments share 
the principal mission of “Public safety [as] job number one.”10 Civil affairs 
activities and homeland security agencies are similarly focused on regional 
security and stability, and share broad commonalities in prevention and response 
frameworks.11 Thus far, no sources have been found that specifically explore the 
potential use of the civil affairs model in homeland security applications. Initial 
research identified several primary fields of information, including stability 
operations, civil affairs, and homeland security initiatives and organization. 
Much of the literature on civil affairs approaches the topic from a military 
perspective. Civil affairs activity has been studied extensively for decades, with 
history, research, and methodology assessing effectiveness. As World War II 
(WWII) progressed, the United States began training military officers for “military 
government duty,” which eventually evolved into formal civil affairs programs.12 
In 1966, the British government published a summary of civil affairs and military 
                                            
10 City of Indianapolis Mayor Greg Ballard, accessed January 14, 2015, 
http://www.mayorgregballard.com/ballard-rules/public-safety.html.  
11 Donald F. Kettl, System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), 12. 
12 Edwin J. Hayward, “Co-Ordination of Military and Civilian Civil Affairs Planning,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 267 (January 1950): 19–27. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1026724. 
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governance activity during WWII.13 Another contemporaneous source, Civil 
Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, offered an American perspective focusing 
on the intricacies of armed forces acting in roles normally occupied by civil 
governments.14 Both volumes summarize the military framework for civil affairs 
through roles traditionally regarded as civilian responsibilities, such as law 
enforcement, food or medical assistance, financial market management, and 
protection of cultural monuments or art treasures. 
Field manuals and other sources describe civil affairs initiatives such as 
community engagement, infrastructure development (i.e., building schools, 
providing clean water, etc.), and traditional use of military force to support 
regional security missions.15 Recent iterations of civil affairs field manuals 
advocate strongly for collaboration between military forces and civilian 
populations: “Properly executed civil affairs operations reduces the friction 
between the civilian population and the military force, and accelerates the return 
of civil functions to indigenous control.”16 
Literature from military sources on civil affairs is fairly extensive. The U.S. 
Army’s field manual on civil affairs provides extensive information on establishing 
and maintaining long-term regional stability.17 Although analyses on civil affairs 
vary in scale of approach, they demonstrate a consistent evolutionary structure 
emphasizing diplomatic collaboration with civilian populations to achieve stability 
and security objectives.  
                                            
13 F.S.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1966). 
14 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs. 
15 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (FM 3-05.401) 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 2007). 
16 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, October 2011), 1-1, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/
fm3_57.pdf. 
17 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, October 2008), iv, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.  
 7 
3. Homeland Security Initiatives 
Homeland security remains an emerging industry and research continues 
to explore its rapidly changing role in American society. There is room in these 
ongoing discussions for consideration of a civil affairs model, perhaps especially 
in the fields of criminal justice and law enforcement. Some homeland security 
researchers advocate for broad, essential goals and flexibility in organizational 
design.18 Other research focuses on recommendations to leverage civic 
partnerships more effectively in support of homeland security efforts.19 Author 
Jerome Kahan argues for decentralizing federal homeland security efforts and 
increasing partnerships with local and state agencies.20 Several federal 
agencies, including the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), have embraced strategies similar to 
those recommended by Kahan. NORTHCOM and FEMA have progressed 
toward regional decentralized organization, collaboration with civilian institutions, 
and increased public engagement.21 Comparable themes are found in 
contemporary public dissatisfaction with police-community relations. Stability 
operations literature emphasizes community needs and may complement these 
discussions. 
                                            
18 Glen Woodbury, “‘Learning’ Homeland Security—How One Executive Education Program 
Engages State and Local Officials,” Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 3 (October 2006), 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/681. 
19 Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto, “Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector 
to Support Homeland Security,” Council Special Report (CSR), no. 13 (March 2006), 
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NeglectedDefenseCSR.pdf. 
20 Jerome Kahan, “It’s Never Too Late: Restructuring the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Regional Framework,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 10, no. 1 
(2013): 353–369, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jhsem.2013.10.issue-1/jhsem-2012-0030/
jhsem-2012-0030.xml. 
21 Collaborative efforts, including NORTHCOM’s Vibrant Response and FEMA’s National 
Exercise Programs, are discussed in Chapter IV. “A Short History of United States Northern 




FEMA’s 2011–2014 strategic plan directs the organization’s resources to 
“foster a whole community approach to emergency management nationally.”22 
Although focused primarily on disaster response and emergency management 
issues, FEMA’s whole community approach identifies strategic needs including 
manmade disasters, terrorist events, and technology changes. FEMA’s national 
preparedness goals incorporate the whole community approach and provide an 
interesting comparison to the civil affairs model. For example, FEMA’s homeland 
security preparedness goals offer five key missions: prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery.23 A recent civil affairs field manual further 
outlines a six-step methodology for use in civil affairs operations: assess, Decide, 
develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition.24 
One area of distinction in homeland security research is the anticipated 
operational environment. Whereas stability operations and civil affairs models are 
focused toward applications in foreign theaters, homeland security research 
(such as FEMA’s whole community approach) is largely intended for application 
on American soil. The intrinsic characteristics of American homeland security 
efforts provide unique distinctions from military models. Generally, the typical 
audience for homeland security literature is American government employees 
and citizens. 
Although the intended audiences differ, military strategies for stability 
operations and civil affairs broadly align with homeland security objectives of 
community collaboration as a means to strengthen and support security 
missions. It is worth noting, however, the significant opposition to even the 
appearance of militarizing portions of homeland security efforts such as law 
                                            
22 FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2011–2014. 
23 “Learn about Presidential Policy Directive-8,” FEMA, last updated October 2, 2015, 
https://www.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-directive-8.  
24 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57). 
 9 
enforcement.25 Stability operations strategy may help soften such concerns by 
laying a foundational methodology for community partnership. However, 
numerous other instances of civil-military coordination have been welcomed, 
particularly during disaster response efforts.26 Further research is needed to 
examine the impact of using the civil affairs model within stability operations to 
assuage concerns about militarization of homeland security assets. 
There appears to be a research information gap on the usefulness of 
stability operations and civil affairs for domestic homeland security applications. 
However, there is ample research on the distinct topics. Within military literature, 
stability operations strategy and civil affairs policy provide contrasts for 
consideration in homeland security. Literature in the emerging field of homeland 
security provides adequate guidance on possible implications for a civil affairs 
model. Given the lack of existing research, this area is worthy of further analysis. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object of Study 
Significant study has been devoted to the strategic purpose and design of 
stability operations and civil affairs models within their military context. Of 
particular interest is analyzing the military approach to stabilizing an area of 
responsibility amid complex circumstances. Specifically, this research examines 
the role of stability operations in unifying diverse interests such as community 
engagement, law enforcement, infrastructure development, and public health 
initiatives. 
Historical case studies of stability operations and civil affairs were studied 
to determine how they have been applied in international environments. To this 
end, secondary research explored non-traditional domestic approaches with 
                                            
25 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of 
American Policing (New York: ACLU, June 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf. 
26 These topics are explored further in Chapter IV. 
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potentially parallel goals such as community-oriented homeland security or 
“whole community programs in American jurisdictions. The novel focus of this 
research is identifying common goals and functions—or lack thereof—between 
stability operations, civil affairs, and homeland security efforts. 
2. Selection Criteria and Rationale 
Conceptually, this author hypothesized that it may prove useful to apply 
stability operations and civil affairs methods to state or local homeland security 
efforts. The military uses these methods to achieve regional security objectives; 
many domestic government agencies engage in homeland security activities with 
similar strategic goals, but without a definitive model to unify planning. This line 
of thinking logically progressed into consideration of how stability operations and 
civil affairs might apply to homeland security efforts. 
The next step in the selection process included a comparative case study 
examination of the British use of civil affairs techniques in stability operations. 
Civil affairs forces have been used across a range of conflict and disaster 
response to meet stability objectives. These and other notable similarities are 
potentially applicable, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1.   Application of Stability Operations for Homeland Security 
Traits of Stability Operations Potential use in Homeland Security 
Clarity of mission and goals Framework for unity of effort 
Use of military force Disaster response, law enforcement 
Force protection / Intelligence activity Data collection and analysis 
Infrastructure development/protection Transportation, utilities, cyber-security 
Engagement of indigenous 
populations 
Community-oriented homeland 
security and whole community 
initiatives 
Mission-focused budgetary decisions State/local budgetary allocation  
 
Table 2.   Civil Affairs Methodology and Homeland Security Goals 








Civil affairs methodology adapted from Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-
57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/
doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.  
National preparedness goals adapted from “Learn about Presidential Policy Directive-8,” FEMA, 
last updated October 2, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-directive-8. 
 
3. Study Limitations 
This author is not a subject-matter expert on stability operations or civil 
affairs. New research will not exhaust existing, meticulously detailed literature on 
these topics. The scope of this research is limited to only some portions of each 
strategy. Because the suitability of stability operations and civil affairs for 
domestic application has not been previously evaluated, there are many 
unknowns. Some portions may not be suitable for implementation due to 
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nuances in American law, cultural practices, and domestic policies, and are 
therefore outside the scope of this research. 
The research also accepts certain limitations in comparing incongruous 
subject matter. For example, military actions in warzones are clearly much 
different than American law enforcement operations. Post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan are subjected to different dynamics than infrastructure 
development in the United States. This author acknowledges that the research 
does not compare “apples to apples,” but rather attempts to identify 
commonalities in areas where the models may be useful within the context of 
American homeland security efforts. 
4. Instrumentation 
The sample areas used in this thesis were selected based upon a review 
of available literature on stability operations strategy, its use of civil affairs 
resources, and homeland security initiatives. This inquiry examined military 
literature, and academic research provides significant sources of information. For 
example, the U.S. military’s field manuals on stability operations and civil affairs 
are hundreds of pages long. Similarly, there are large amounts of research into 
various facets of homeland security. This author has not used interviews or 
surveys, but relies on voluminous material available on the primary subject 
matter. 
5. Steps of Analysis 
A hybrid approach—combining case study and policy options analysis—is 
used to answer the primary research questions. Although a greater emphasis 
has been placed on the review of policy options, case studies examine strategic 
approaches and specific applications of policy. The combined analysis approach 
is intended to enhance practical recommendations for real-world applications. In 
addition to using case studies as examples for specific policy options, the 
following steps were taken in this analysis: 
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1. Define the problem (context, assumptions, goals). 
2. Identify possible solutions (no change, moderate change, drastic 
change). 
3. Evaluative criteria (realistic, legality, comparative effectiveness). 
4. Identify projected outcomes for possible solutions (policy options 
matrix). 
5. Discuss advantages and disadvantages of potential outcomes. 
6. Select and explain the best solution. 
7. Provide recommendations for implementation. 
8. Share drafts with known stakeholders for discussion. 
9. Revise and repeat steps as needed. 
 
6. Intended Output 
Because the topic is unique, this research offers ample opportunity for 
additional inquiry. This paper concludes by answering the primary research 
questions and providing a recommendation for state and local practitioners. 
Using stability operations strategy and the civil affairs model, this author provides 
a framework for implementation. The goal is to provide political leaders and/or 
agency executives with a unified model for protecting their citizens. Such a 
strategy may provide clarity and guidance for domestic homeland security 
objectives. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II discusses stability operations from a strategic perspective, 
examines its historical evolution, and identifies key elements of stability 
operations methodology. Chapter III explores the role of military civil affairs 
forces in stability operations, recognizes fundamental principles of civil affairs 
operations, and provides a case study of the British approach to civil affairs. 
Chapter IV shifts focus to domestic homeland security efforts in which 
stability operations strategy may be helpful, including disaster response, law 
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enforcement, and civil-military operations. Chapter V provides several policy 
options: maintaining current methods, implementing small-scale stability 
operations strategy, and implementing comprehensive regional stability 
operations strategy. Chapter VI concludes with a thesis summary and 
suggestions for future research. 
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II. STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY 
Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they 
will surprise you with their ingenuity. 
—General George S. Patton 
 
Although governments exist to provide stability and security for their 
citizens, history is littered with examples of their related shortcomings. In many 
cases, the American military has responded to instability, conflict, or disasters by 
executing a community-focused stability operations strategy in support of U.S. 
national security interests. This strategy has been most often deployed in foreign 
territories during post-conflict and disaster relief efforts. 
This chapter provides an historical context for the development of stability 
operations strategy and describes its methodological design. Primary stability 
operations tasks are identified and discussed in later chapters for their 
applicability in domestic homeland security initiatives. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
Although designed with broad scope, stability operations strategy is not a 
universal resolution to all military situations, disasters, or humanitarian crises. 
This research accepts that a one-size-fits-all solution is unrealistic to address the 
complexities of military and homeland security environments. Certainly the U.S. 
military recognizes that other tactics are sometimes required.27 Stability 
operations strategy offers military commanders or—in the case of homeland 
security efforts—state and local leaders a decentralized option for resolving 
community problems. At times, other methods will be necessary. 
                                            
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2011), I-15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. 
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B. EVOLUTION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY 
The U.S. military uses its assets to support American national security 
goals.28 Throughout history, the majority of U.S. military activities could be 
characterized as peacetime operations focused on regional stability, interrupted 
by periodic episodes of conventional warfare. In the late 1780s, President 
George Washington directed U.S. Secretary of War Henry Knox to develop 
military plans to guard settlers, regulate trade, and enforce laws. This trend 
continued into the 19th century as the American military continued to defend 
settlers and enforce treaty agreements with Native American tribes.29 
During the mid-1840s occupation of Mexican territory, American General 
Winfield Scott gained widespread support from the indigenous population. Gen. 
Scott ensured his troops protected local economic interests, started programs to 
remove trash and repair war damage, and hired local workers.30 The post-Civil 
War period of Reconstruction in southern states is perhaps the most publicized 
example of U.S. stability operations. American forces established security 
throughout the country’s southern territory and organized efforts to restore new 
state governments in accordance with national policy. U.S. military forces 
assumed three types of roles during the unique era of Reconstruction: 
A post-war occupation force supporting presidentially appointed civilian 
government (1865–1867) 
A military government (Reconstruction Acts of 1867) 
A supporting force for elected state governments (until 1877)31 
These distinct strategies provided a precedent for future stability operations in 
other parts of the world. At the turn of the 20th century, the United States began 
to expand its international military influence. In Cuba, an American military 
                                            
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0), I-14. 
29 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 1-1 – 1-2. 
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government was imposed in conjunction with health, security, and public works 
initiatives. Similar efforts in the Caribbean and Latin America led to long-term 
insurgencies or armed opposition and were unable to establish successful 
democratic governments.32 In 1902, conflict subsided in the Philippines and the 
United States used a decentralized military strategy to deploy hundreds of units 
through the islands.33 The widespread deployment strategy in the Philippines 
was successful. The success of stability operations strategy was attributed to 
relationships formed between soldiers and Filipino citizens.34 
After WWII, Allied occupations of Germany and Japan became models for 
stability operations in the modern era. In Germany, a multinational effort helped 
restore order and stability to the region. American military assets, particularly the 
U.S. Army, were reoriented from combat operations to peacetime missions. In 
Japan, the initial phase of U.S. occupation focused on securing and demilitarizing 
the country. Within sixty days, the U.S. strategy shifted to implementation of 
military governance; democratic principles were gradually introduced into 
Japanese society. Subsequent military oversight focused on monitoring and 
facilitating the rehabilitation of Japanese territories in support of American 
national security needs.35 
The success of ensuing U.S. stability operations was less convincing. In 
1958, the United States deployed 14,000 troops to Lebanon for three months to 
assist with civil unrest and support a pro-Western regime, with mixed results.36 A 
few years later, America became involved in the Vietnam War and was unable to 
duplicate its earlier successes in the Philippines. Operationally, the U.S. military’s 
traditional combat operations struggled to succeed against a significant 
                                            
32 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-2. 
33 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model 
or a Muddle?” Parameters (Winter 2005–2006): 43. 
34 John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 
1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 288–289. 
35 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-2. 
36 Ibid. 
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insurgency and failed to establish regional stability despite a sizeable advantage 
in strategic resources. 
Stability operations strategy in Vietnam was expected to be successful as 
it had been elsewhere. The Vietnam War’s unpopularity and failures had a 
profound impact on future U.S. stability operations.37 Some stability operations in 
Vietnam, however, were actually quite effective. The U.S. Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support program, which organized small teams of 
civil and military assets throughout South Vietnam, is viewed as one of the 
conflict’s few successes.38 
America was ill prepared for defeat in Southeast Asia. For the next several 
decades and throughout the Cold War, support for stability operations waned 
significantly, burdened by Vietnam’s hard lessons. American military posture 
shifted dramatically in favor of preparing for conventional means of warfare. As 
Communist threats subsided, the U.S. military pivoted from a military superpower 
competing for dominance to an international partner in peacekeeping missions. 
During the intervening years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks 
on September 11, 2001, stability operations once again took a prominent role. 
American troops were committed to fifteen different stability operations in the 
Caribbean, the Balkans, the African continent, and elsewhere.39 
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, similar cycles have continued. 
The United States has engaged in a variety of efforts to mitigate the effects of 
government collapses, significant insurgencies, and humanitarian crises. As 
these trends endure in contemporary events, stability operations have taken a 
prominent role in U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.40 Historically, traditional 
combat operations have been a primary U.S. military mission. In 2005, during an 
era of persistent conflict in the Middle East, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
                                            
37 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-2. 
38 McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 44. 
39 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-2. 
40 Ibid., 1-2. 
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formally recognized the importance of stability operations strategy. The DOD 
issued Instruction 3000.05, marking stability operations a “core U.S. military 
mission.”41 This instruction specifically noted that “stability operations were likely 
more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional 
combat operations.”42 This dramatic shift placed the role of stability operations 
on par with defensive and offensive military efforts, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Spectrum of Stability Operations 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2008) http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-
07.pdf, 2-1.
Stability operations strategy incorporates a flexible model to accommodate 
the range of conflict and determine the posture needed for mission objectives. 
The increasing prevalence of stability operations in modern doctrine suggests 
they will play an integral role in future military engagements.43 Future defense 
budgets, however, may not fund stability operations at the levels experienced in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.44 Fiscal concerns may cast some uncertainty on the future 
role of stability operations as a core U.S. military strategy. 
41 Department of Defense (DOD), Stability Operations (DODI 3000.05) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2009), 2, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. 
42 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), vi. 
43 McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 34. 
44 Nick Simeone, “Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure,” DOD 
News, February 24, 2014. http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121703.  
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C. STABILITY OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY 
In executing stability operations, the DOD’s military directives are guided 
by the National Security Strategy.45 Within this framework, Field Manual 3-07 is 
the U.S. Army’s official doctrine for stability operations.46 This strategy evolved 
from earlier concepts of “military operations other than war.”47 The manual 
provides a regularly updated guide for military leaders to plan and execute 
stability operations and establishes a foundation for related military doctrine.48 
Further, the manual pivots military resources toward post-conflict peacekeeping 
strategies focused on “achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive 
approach” specifically using a “whole of government” approach.49 
U.S. stability operations, in their essence, aim to provide time to restore 
public order and rebuild government institutions that encourage peace and 
stability.50 Military forces’ role in stability operations is to support other 
government efforts by focusing on the local population’s needs: 
Stability operations is an umbrella term for various military 
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States 
in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain 
or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief. [Emphasis added]51  
Like most American military plans, stability operations strategy is intended 
for application outside the United States. Field Manual 3-07 is unique among 
                                            
45 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 2-4. 
46 Ibid., iv. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Operations Other than War (Joint Publication 3-07), V-33. 
48 Like other military doctrine, FM 3-07 is updated periodically in response to contemporary 
issues. The most recent version was published in June 2014, with additional attention given to 
transitional governments. This author relied on the 2008 version, in part for its more concise 
charts and potential relevance to homeland security issues. The 2014 update is available at 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf. 
49 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), iv.  
50 Ibid., vi. 
51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0), v-4. 
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military manuals; it has a wide scope that merges diverse U.S. military assets 
across a range of theaters. For example, the manual describes the benefits of 
leveraging military assets to establish safe environments in combat theaters and 
transitioning to civilian governance. Conversely, it also describes how the same 
methodology can support allies through peacetime military engagement prior to 
conflict. Both applications are focused on long-term endeavors to achieve 
stability and maintain peace.52 Figure 3 illustrates the interconnected relationship 
between various aspects of stability operations strategy. 
Figure 3.  Relationships Impacting Stability Operations 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Techniques (ATP 3-07.5) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, August 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/
atp3_07x5.pdf.  
In stability operations, these relationships can be improved through unified 
actions: “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration” of civil, 
government, and military operations.53 Field Manual 3-07 provides an integrated 
                                            
52 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), vii. 
53 Ibid., 1-3. 
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framework for the “spectrum of conflict”—from environments of peace to war.54 
The manual provides examples of its flexible goals, which include: 
Peacetime support of allies 
Limited intervention in humanitarian disaster response 
Peaceful enforcement of international ceasefire agreements 
Support of friendly governments during irregular warfare 
Preparation for post-conflict actions in combat operations 
Facilitation of stable civil governance in post-conflict phase55 
 
As operations are executed, plans are re-evaluated and can be adjusted 
to respond to mission variables.56 For stability operations to succeed, Field 
Manual 3-07 describes the need for a measured, scalable response through 
coordinated civil and military resources. Each action is influenced by the nature 
of threats and factors unique to the situation. Successful stability operations need 
a conflict assessment that accounts for diverse factors and merges them into a 
comprehensive plan with deliberate objectives.57 
1. Unity of Effort 
To navigate the intricacies of collaboration, stability operations use a 
layered methodology to manage complex goals and work toward unity of effort.58 
Specifically, stability operations strategy uses a “whole of government approach” 
to manage collaboration between government resources and a “comprehensive 
approach” to integrate all government, multinational, and private partnerships 
                                            
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 2-1. 
57 Ibid., 1-3. 
58 Ibid., 1-3 – 1-4. 
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toward a common goal.59 The comprehensive approach comprises four 
foundational principles: 
Accommodate: determine resource priorities through accommodation of 
participant concerns 
Understand: strive for collective knowledge of situation and shared goal 
Base on purpose: shared efforts committed to common goal 
Cooperate: work together with trust, sharing, and transparency60 
 
It is difficult to determine when unity of effort has been achieved. Since 
WWII, every U.S. presidential administration has implemented a program or 
issued a directive designed to ensure inter-agency coordination. For example, 
President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, formalizing 
interagency cooperation between intelligence and political advisors. President 
Eisenhower began to unify policy development and implementation in the armed 
forces. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Clinton each took executive actions to 
provide unity of effort for overseas military activity, including stability operations. 
With each new presidential administration, policy directives designed for inter-
agency collaboration also changed, with varying degrees of success. The cycling 
political change every four to eight years has challenged consistency in 
integration and made long-term unity of effort an elusive goal.61 Figure 4 depicts 
the current U.S. stability operations strategy to organize unity of effort and the 
delegation of stability tasks. 
                                            
59 Ibid., 1-4. 
60 Ibid., 1-5 – 1-6. 
61 Ibid., 1-13. 
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Figure 4.  Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-5, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/
repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.  
To address unity of effort challenges in stability operations, in 2005 
President George W. Bush signed a directive that officially declared stability 
operations a “necessary capability” of federal government. The directive 
designated the Department of State as the lead agency responsible for stability 
operations and mandated synchronization between the secretaries of state and 
defense in planning and operations throughout conflict phases.62 The 
Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) is responsible for coordinating stability operations strategy 
and ensuring adaptability in scale and scope for mission needs.63 In the context 
of post-conflict reconstruction, the S/CRS unifies the execution of five stability 
task sectors: 
 
                                            
62 Ibid., 1-13 – 1-14. 
63 Ibid., 1-14. 
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Security 
Justice and reconciliation 
Humanitarian and social well-being 
Governance and participation 
Economic stabilization and infrastructure64 
 
Recent efforts in Afghanistan demonstrate the challenge to unify efforts. 
Collaboration with civilian elements was disjointed and ultimately proved to be an 
elusive goal. Perhaps this was due, in part, to early U.S. expectations that the 
United Nations (U.N.) or a coalition of other countries would ultimately play a 
greater role in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Because of these unrealistic 
expectations, the United States believed its role in Afghanistan’s nation-building 
would be fleeting.65 The Afghan president, however, thought the United States 
would maintain a stabilizing presence for decades to come.66 In spite of U.S. 
stabilization efforts, Afghanistan was left without a strong alliance to unify stability 
efforts with civilian and international interests.67 One lesson from Afghanistan is 
a need for increased engagement of civilian interests to balance military and 
civilian sectors.68 
2. Conflict Transformation 
Field Manual 3-07 recommends transferring the momentum of combat into 
productive peacekeeping efforts, although this is easier said than done. 
However, this is not an insurmountable task, as demonstrated by the rapid pivot 
                                            
64 Ibid., 2-5. 
65 Michèle A. Flournoy, “Nation-Building: Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” in Nation-
Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyuama, 86–104 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006), 86. 
66 Barbara J. Stapleton and Michael Keating, Military and Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan 
2001–14: An Incoherent Approach (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2015), 3. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/
20150722MilitaryCivilianAssistanceAfghanistanStapletonKeating.pdf. 
67 Stapleton and Keating, Military and Civilian Assistance, 2. 
68 Ibid., 10. 
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from combat posture to stability operations in post-WWII Japan.69 Even while 
hostilities are ongoing, elements of stability operations must begin to identify root 
causes of conflict, regional dynamics, and potential solutions via a detailed 
analysis. These efforts should be narrowly focused on “imposing order, reducing 
violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting 
an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord.”70 Military force is 
often needed in these situations, but lasting peace will necessitate strong 
cooperation with civilian institutions and/or international partners.71 
3. Legitimacy and Rule of Law 
For stability operations to be successful, it is essential to gain citizens’ 
trust and confidence in the mission. Accessible government organizations and 
stability partners are important for developing citizen confidence and crucial to 
gaining consent from the governed. Establishing an equitable system of justice in 
compliance with international law builds internal and external legitimacy.72 
Fairness in the rule of law and the government’s accountability is vital to 
promoting peace and establishing legitimacy.73 According to Field Manual 3-07, 
effective government does not “go to war against its population,” and successful 
legitimacy requires four basic traits: 
Supports basic human rights and freedoms 
Is submissive to the will of citizens, particularly in election results 
Preserves sovereignty by maintaining effective law and order 
Protects societal rights by limiting government intrusions74 
                                            
69 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 7. 
70 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-6. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 1-7. 
73 Ibid., 1-9. 
74 Ibid., 1-7. 
 27 
Obviously, these traits represent an American perspective on successful 
governance. Other forms of government, however, are also capable of 
establishing effective stability in their jurisdictions. In either case, legitimacy is 
dependent on well-trained professionals successfully executing core stability 
tasks.75 Most often, legitimacy requires the consent of the host nation. 
Exceptions to this rule generally require a widely acknowledged mandate, such 
as an international response to regimes that jeopardize other nations’ security or 
intentionally create humanitarian crises. In order to maintain legitimacy in stability 
operations, citizens’ expectations of judicial fairness must be met.76 According to 
Field Manual 3-07, rule of law is established when: 
Government controls the use of force in settling disputes. 
Citizens and their property are safe. 
Government operates within fair legal boundaries. 
Citizens are provided an effective and impartial system of justice. 
Government protects fundamental rights and freedoms.77 
 
4. National Security Interests 
Stability operations strategy manifests U.S. policy perspectives into 
humanitarian missions, disaster relief, military intervention, and other foreign 
affairs in fragile states.78 Environments that require external resources to achieve 
stability can present significant challenges to American interests.79 To meet 
these challenges, American stability operations are designed to support U.S. 
interests by improving safety, security, and stability throughout the world.80 
Reconstruction efforts, engagement with local populations, and other strategies 
                                            
75 Ibid. 
76 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-7. 
77 Ibid., 1-9. 
78 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0), I-14. 
79 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-10. 
80 Ibid. 
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emphasize international partnerships and coordination to establish “favorable 
long-term security conditions,” but must always support U.S. national security 
interests.81 
Fragile states inherently attract destabilizing dynamics that aggravate 
already tenuous circumstances. Particularly in these troubled regions, American 
national security strategies guide stability operations and counter regional 
volatility by promoting democratic principles. America’s national security policies 
focus on long-term conflict prevention and resolution by establishing stability and 
promoting democracy and economic viability.82 
When military force is deemed necessary to restore order, the U.S. 
national security strategy remains focused on reinstating local institutions such 
as law enforcement, courts, utilities, and basic government services. At their 
conclusion, successful stability operations leave the target area safe and secure 
with an established rule of law, stable government, and viable economy.83 The 
population must also be left with basic essentials: “food, water, shelter, basic 
sanitation, and health care.”84 These needs are often the initial focus of disaster 
response and humanitarian aid. Long-term transformation also requires an 
educational system, leadership accountability, and peaceful coexistence of 
citizens.85 Stable regions are generally more favorable to U.S. national security 
interests. 
D. PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS 
By design, military units are intended to be well organized, properly 
trained, versatile, and ready for combat in uncertain environments. The success 
of these forces often hinges on military commanders’ ability to properly identify 
                                            
81 Ibid., 1-12. 
82 Ibid., 1-11. 
83 Ibid., 1-16. 
84 Ibid., 1-17. 
85 Ibid. 
 29 
and prioritize mission-critical tasks. Diversity in support organizations and the 
host nation’s capacity for change are also critically important. In the 
unpredictable theaters necessitating stability operations, military forces are often 
the only steadying presence. Upon arrival, military personnel must establish and 
maintain order while meeting the host-nation population’s critical needs. In 
disaster response, for example, the military may help facilitate access to aid 
organizations in order to ease the burden on military resources.86 
Planning, coordination, and execution of successful stability operations 
depend on a contextual familiarity of the culture.87 While U.S. military forces 
operate under the authority of the president, the Departments of Defense and 
State formally coordinate their national security issues and areas of responsibility 
through the National Security Council.88 Situational analysis accounting for an 
accurate cultural perspective should inform critical decisions in early phases of 
stability operations. Indeed, U.S. stability operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and 
elsewhere demonstrate the need for strategies informed by cultural nuances to 
avoid regrettable decisions.89 Resources from the Department of State and other 
collaborative partners provide historical and region-specific context to stability 
operations planning.90 Proper appraisal of the culture can help minimize potential 
conflict. In post-conflict stages of stability operations such as humanitarian 
assistance and peace operations, the Department of Defense may rely more 
significantly on coordination with Department of State resources to develop 
cultural awareness.91 
This strategic reliance on coordinated actions, cultural understanding, and 
financial resources can be challenging. Critics of U.S. stability operations in 
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Afghanistan argue these policies allow corruption to continue and contend a lack 
of cultural understanding ultimately de-stabilized the region. Similar criticisms are 
leveled toward stability operations strategies that incorporate counter-insurgency 
tactics intended to wield economic resources.92 The significant economic 
resources needed to stabilize Afghanistan, for example, caused the U.S. Army to 
develop a handbook entitled Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons 
System.93 Despite these efforts, some research suggests contradictory military 
and civilian interests negatively impacted stability operations in Afghanistan.94 
The skeptical views of these strategies may underscore limitations or competing 
dynamics in stability operations collaboration. These vulnerabilities may be 
countered with detailed objectives designed to avoid ambiguity and by ensuring 
sufficient resources are dedicated to accomplish the mission objectives.95 
Some research indicates the advantages of a decentralized command 
structure in stability operations may lessen any unfavorable ambiguity in mission 
objectives.96 Particularly in post-conflict settings, an accurate cultural 
assessment remains key to developing successful stabilization strategy and 
reinforces the importance of collaboration between stakeholders. Regardless of 
the environment, stability operations are designed to accomplish specific tasks 
such as addressing root causes of conflict, repairing damage caused by 
disasters, or helping to resolve government failures.97 According to the U.S. 
Army, stability operations will encounter one or more of the following challenges: 
“fragile states, conflict, poverty and non-functioning national/local markets, 
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belligerents, and corruption.”98 Stability tasks are designed to resolve these 
types of issues. 
In ideal stability operations, the host-nation’s civil government structure 
remains functional and stakeholders quickly engage in collaborative support 
tasks. For cases in which security has deteriorated or government service is 
inadequate, military personnel may begin to deliver services normally provided 
by civil government or aid organizations. Even the United States uses military 
support to assist civil authorities during disasters and civil disorder.99 To clarify 
scope, Field Manual 3-07 describes three different categories of tasks in stability 
operations: 
Tasks for which the military retains primary responsibility 
Tasks for which civilian groups are primarily responsible, but military 
forces are ready to perform if necessary 
Tasks for which civilian groups are primarily responsible without support 
from military resources100 
 
Accurately identifying, prioritizing, and executing stability tasks is the key 
to successful stability operations. These processes require support with partners 
and the host population, and require some knowledge and sensitivity to the host 
nation’s culture.101 If, for example, the military commander misidentifies a task 
and subsequently misallocates resources, the mission will fail. If the task is 
identified properly but the execution lacks needed support, the mission will still 
fail. The pace of progress will vary, but mission success in stability operations 
requires significant planning and coordinated action by all parties. Generally 
speaking, these plans emphasize non-lethal action to achieve mission 
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objectives:102 Figure 5 depicts the cooperative role of stability “lines of effort” or 
tasks used to guide strategy and allocate resources.103 
Figure 5.  Examples of Stability Lines of Effort 
 
Adapted from Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/
FM307/FM3-07.pdf.  
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For obvious reasons, the methodology for stability operations deals only 
with areas of military responsibility and does not address solely civilian tasks. 
Stability tasks are categorized with an emphasis on meeting final objectives 
within a specified time period.104 Individual tasks are likely more complicated 
than they appear. For example, to ensure a safe environment for a population, 
other objectives must first be achieved. Providing security may involve resolving 
long-standing disputes, restoring law and order, eliminating life-threatening 
hazards, etc. As time goes on, each of these primary stability task sectors will 
become increasingly complicated.105  
1. Civil Security 
U.S. military policy acknowledges that protecting civilians from harm 
during every operation is important.106 Stability operations strategy goes a step 
further—it includes tasks focused on developing stable civil organizations and 
securing a safe operational environment.107 Each situation is unique and civil 
security strategies have been implemented in a variety of stabilization 
environments.108 Layers of civilian protection vary by mission, and may be 
interpreted differently by stakeholders. Figure 6 depicts layers of civil security 
options that may be used across a range of conflict environments. 
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Figure 6.  Layers of Civilian Protection 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Protection of Civilians (ATP 3-07.6) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2015), 1-2, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/
DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x6.pdf. 
In post-conflict environments, stability tasks focus on civil security and 
reorienting military resources toward demobilization efforts. The goal is to 
eliminate hostilities through negotiations and other peacekeeping processes. 
During this phase, disarmament of combatants is likely to occur in conjunction 
with efforts to reintegrate belligerent fighters’ sympathetic supporters. Ideally, 
support from diplomatic and military resources fosters an environment of 
restoration for those willing to engage in peaceful reorganization.109 Even the 
threat of lethal alternatives may compel adversaries to a peaceful compromise. 
Although stability operations rely primarily on nonlethal actions, the possibility of 
traditional military force can be leveraged to achieve stability objectives.110 
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After the combat environment is demobilized, effective border control and 
internal freedom of movement for the population are important indicators of 
stability. The resumption of public health monitoring, tax collection, and other 
essential government functions are also important stability tasks. In order for 
these services to be restored, forces must be able to ensure the protection of civil 
reconstruction groups and facilities.111 U.S. homeland security agencies face 
similar challenges and frequently respond to dangerous environments. For 
example, police and fire agencies must remove hazards from unstable scenes 
before civilians or other stakeholders can safely return. 
Civil security objectives in stability operations can also be subject to 
sudden change, particularly in political situations. This was evident in 
Afghanistan when the primary U.S. security mission shifted quickly from 
defeating an insurgency to finding a graceful exit strategy for U.S. forces. As 
Americans became more skeptical about military involvement in Afghanistan, 
political pressure influenced plans for troop withdrawals.112 The new civil security 
objective may have been politically expedient, but it was a dramatic departure 
from earlier stability tasks to which America had been strongly committed.113 A 
lack of long-term consistency challenges the effectiveness of civil security efforts. 
2. Civil Control 
Regulating behavior and safety is challenging, even in relatively peaceful 
cultures. In places where stability operations are necessary, instituting rule of law 
under civil control can be a complicated process. Stability forces and other 
government advisors will also be called upon to assess the host nation’s security 
capabilities and leadership competency. In failed states, foreign military police 
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forces may be the logical choice for crowd control and other, typically civilian, 
police services, as well as for re-establishing judicial courts and evaluating the 
correctional system.114 Prior systems of justice may have been abusive or 
corrupt, resulting in strongly held feelings of inequality. Rather than simple 
intervention, civil control encompasses plans to build peace by addressing 
systemic inequalities.115 Resolving these core issues has proven challenging in 
places such as Kosovo, where local populations still struggle to resolve judicial 
inequality and historical injustices.116 
As the criminal justice system is reintroduced, vulnerable populations 
need protection and new legal systems will need to be accepted as legitimate. In 
cases of war crimes against humanity, stability operations personnel and their 
international partners oversee the investigation and subsequent tribunals. After 
these steps have been taken, it is essential to ensure community outreach 
programs are in place to encourage reconciliation and open communication with 
the host nation’s government and its partners.117 Ensuring fair and effective law 
enforcement is a difficult but necessary task to maintain order.118 Civil control 
looks beyond intervention to transformative peace-building processes that 
addresses systemic inequalities.119 
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3. Restoration of Essential Services 
War, disaster, and other humanitarian crises interfere with public services. 
Effected populations must have access to food, water, shelter, and medical 
assistance for stability operations to be successful.120 Meeting immediate 
humanitarian needs and avoiding worsening crises is a primary objective of 
stability operations.121 In fulfilling this objective, military commanders must 
balance strategic needs and logistical decisions, such as the means of 
delivery.122 In regions prone to famine or food scarcity, military support for 
emergency food relief, famine prevention, or public health programs and 
education can be crucial.123 
Civilian aid organizations may be more beneficial in long-term relief 
efforts, but military forces are often called upon to support or provide food or 
medical aid when others are unable to. Patchwork arrangements for basic 
necessities may be less than ideal, and corruption remains problematic; in 
Afghanistan, for example, electrical power infrastructure remains unreliable 
despite four billion dollars of international investment.124 Although not yet a true 
success, the investment in infrastructure may still represent significant progress 
relative to the region’s prior state.125 
After a conflict or disaster, the realities of human suffering may exceed 
military forces’ immediate capability. In some cases, citizens may have been 
dislocated from their homes by force or circumstance. Stability operations 
personnel may encounter refugee camps or need to establish sites for these 
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civilians.126 Long-term, collaborative relationships between government and 
NGOs are the key to overcoming complex crises. The presence of stability 
operations personnel must not weaken the rule of law or worsen the exigent 
circumstances. Efforts to reinstate essential services are oriented toward 
restoring utility services, public health initiatives, and educational opportunities, 
and cessation of historical patterns of abuse.127 
Sustainable, long-term recovery is dependent on financial stability and 
maintaining restored services. Economic and infrastructure development should 
be scaled to local capacity and designed to stimulate their commercial markets. 
The military can play a significant role in generating employment opportunities 
and rebuilding infrastructure. Care should be taken to avoid worsening the 
situation for locals by upsetting the local economy. Enterprises generated by 
residents to provide goods or services create a means for sustainability after the 
departure of stability operations resources. 
4. Support to Governance 
Conditions for civil governance must be established in a manner that is 
supported by the local population. Early phases of force deployment focus on 
civil control while later stages are better suited for transitioning to civil 
governance.128 Legitimacy is needed for a successful transition to civil authorities 
after military operations cease.129 Whatever the form of civil governance, the 
chosen political structure must be acceptable to stakeholders.130 Ideally, the 
strongest consensus should be among the local population to be governed. In 
some cases, such as Kosovo from 1999–2008, an international governing body 
was used until self-government was possible.131 During this phase, support for 
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civil authorities is formalized and transitions to civilian governance may begin. 
When shifting to local control, appointed local authorities should be vetted in a 
manner that fosters legitimacy with the local population and reduces corruption 
when possible.132 
5. Support to Financial Institutions and Public Investment 
A nation’s economic health has a direct impact on its ability to effectively 
govern. Stability operations support economic growth in local markets and a 
strong central banking system to strengthen national economies.133 Stability 
operations forces may support tasks designed to ensure the success of the host-
nation’s financial markets and currency exchange. Government revenue streams 
such as tax collection and trade organizations may need to be reestablished to 
resume generation of revenue. 
Local economic development should be integrated with long-term planning 
to minimize unintended consequences from sudden, dramatic investments. In 
many areas, supporting the agricultural sector is important for domestic food 
production and trade. Stability operations work toward developing transportation 
and market infrastructures that ensure an effective food distribution network.134 
Maintaining infrastructure—such as a rebuilt electrical grid, sanitation system, or 
clean water system—will strengthen regional vitality and stability.135 Even in the 
United States, poor maintenance of critical infrastructure can have serious 
homeland security implications. For example, President Obama recently declared 
a state of emergency in Flint, Michigan, after shortcuts in critical infrastructure 
investment led to a “man-made water disaster.”136 Ignoring critical infrastructure 
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is unacceptable in community-oriented stabilization strategy, and can have dire 
consequences for U.S. homeland security. 
Stability operations stakeholders evaluate investment priorities in 
coordination with other government agencies and private aid organizations. For 
example, public investment in educational institutions, healthcare, and effective 
management of natural resources may develop transformative private sector 
opportunities.137 Employment initiatives, banking institutions, national treasury 
and financial markets stabilization, and natural resources protection support long-
term economic stability and eventual independence.138 Investments designed to 
address food shortages or improve malnutrition rates are not areas of traditional 
military interest. However, these areas have a significant correlation to civil 
unrest and instability. Initiatives to address these issues are increasingly vital for 
economic development in “fragile and conflict-affected” states.139 
6. Information Engagement 
Stability operations will be ineffective without proactive communication 
and engagement with the affected population. Information engagement and 
outreach efforts are incorporated into each stability sector. Throughout phases of 
operations, situations are reevaluated through detailed, formalized risk 
assessments. Military public affairs, psychological operations, and similar efforts 
are designed to develop local support.140 Rather than simple outreach, 
information engagement is designed to improve credibility and legitimacy through 
continued dialogue with often-skeptical audiences.141 These forms of interaction 
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may be particularly important with the advent of social media and other 
communications technology. 
The success of stability operations is often contingent on the local 
populace’s positive perceptions. Friendly activities in each stability sector 
enhance information engagement and credibility.142 The mission of stability 
operations relies on gaining the community’s confidence and developing 
collaborative relationships. Engaging communities by sharing information, 
listening to their concerns, and meeting their critical needs builds trust and 
provides shared goals and objectives for the overall mission.143 Figure 7 depicts 
the integration of information engagement into specific stability tasks. 
Figure 7.  The Role of Information Engagement in Primary Stability 
Tasks 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2008), 3-19, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/
FM3-07.pdf. 
142 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 2-4. 
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E. ANALYSIS 
The long history of stability operations strategy and readily available 
methodology provides a strong basis for consideration. The approach has been 
tested in a variety of theaters across a range of conflicts and disasters. 
Throughout its history, stability operations strategy remains focused on the local 
population to achieve mission objectives.144 Without support from the affected 
community, success is not possible. 
The U.S. government publishes significant information outlining stability 
operations strategy. While the outcome of stability operations strategy has been 
thoroughly studied, there are few studies that demonstrate a reliable assessment 
of their cost-benefit. For instance, ample statistics demonstrate improvements in 
Afghanistan stability objectives such as education, healthcare, and civil 
security.145 Although it is clear that significant expenditures were committed to 
obtain those results, no research assesses the effectiveness of the 
investment.146 Such analysis would be beneficial, but lies outside the scope of 
this inquiry as well. 
Some research contends that stability operations and peacekeeping 
efforts may not be ideal for conflicts involving civil war.147 One study examined 
civil wars between 1946 and 1999 and found peacekeeping intervention efforts 
during created impediments to long-term mediation.148 Although military forces in 
stability operations were generally beneficial, the study found the dynamics of 
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civil war prevented similar achievements.149 When applied to civil war conflicts, 
stabilization strategy may enjoy short-term successes but are at higher risk for 
long-term failure without significant investment in stability operations.150 
“Unity of effort” may be a popular axiom in government literature, but Field 
Manual 3-07 and other stability operations literature does provide some 
specificity in unifying stability task sectors.151 One area of concern is considering 
political influences on the overall strategy. Misunderstood political expectations in 
Afghanistan led to execution missteps in the overall U.S. strategy to stabilize the 
country.152 Continued uncertainty in that part of the world proves the importance 
of long-term strategic commitment. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The use of U.S. stability operations strategy has been successful more 
often than not. Although research shows the approach may be less effective 
during civil wars, it is reasonable to assume that such environments represent a 
most significant challenge to any positive resolution. While not an exact 
comparison to modern homeland security efforts, it is interesting to note that 
early military stabilization strategies were used successfully in southern states 
after the American Civil War.153 
Plans for domestic application should involve long-term commitments, 
which may bode well for the applicability of stability operations as a homeland 
security strategy. Given stability operations’ strategic focus on resolving systemic 
issues, the investments needed to execute the strategy are equally long-term 
and significant.154 Interagency cooperation, such as the partnership between the 
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Departments of Defense and State, may provide beneficial guidance for 
cooperation between federal, state, and local homeland security agencies.155 As 
a strategic model, the breakdown of stability sectors and tasks offer other useful 
considerations for homeland security that are explored further in later chapters. 
An early evaluation of stabilization doctrine during military occupation was 
titled Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors.156 Indeed, this title echoes 
modern assessments of stabilization strategy: “During stability operations, 
leaders and Soldiers become governors in a much broader sense, influencing 
events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military instrument 
of national power.”157 Chapter III examines the role civil affairs forces play in 
executing stability operations strategy. 
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III. CIVIL AFFAIRS 
If our intent is to avoid war, then at the end of a conflict we must 
create the conditions for peace, rather than for subsequent strife. If 
we are to overcome strategic myopia, we must address the civil 
sector. 
—Colonel Kurt E. Müller 
 
Civil affairs has been aptly defined as “armed social work.”158 In its 
infancy, civil affairs was synonymous with military occupation, but its meaning 
has changed significantly.159 In this research, “stability operations” has referred 
to a comprehensive strategy for stabilization. The term “civil affairs” describes 
military units and methods designed to execute stabilization strategy.160 
According to the U.S. Army, civil affairs workers are “specifically trained and 
educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and 
with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations.”161 American 
civil affairs resources are now organized within the U.S. Special Operations 
Command and deploy across all phases of combat and response 
environments.162 
Civil affairs forces engage populations and local institutions to “shape the 
civil environment” by mitigating or defeating threats and assuming responsibilities 
typically belonging to civil governments.163 U.S. civil affairs methodology even 
describes its suitability for supporting civil authorities “within the United States 
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and its territories.”164 This chapter introduces twelve principles guiding civil 
affairs activities and examines the British approach to civil affairs as an 
alternative strategic method. The impact of these ideas on homeland security 
efforts is discussed further in subsequent chapters. This chapter explores the 
role of civil affairs policy in stability operations and provides recommendations for 
consideration in homeland security. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
This author recognizes that military activities (such as civil affairs) and 
homeland security applications are not “apples and apples.” Given a research 
gap on the topic and the nature of predictive inquiry, some latitude is extended in 
considering the broad characteristics of civil affairs. This area of research on civil 
affairs generally focuses on strategic objectives that demonstrate potential 
cohesion with homeland security efforts. Tactical functionalities may be 
discussed briefly, but generally fall outside the scope of this research.165 
B. THE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS 
As the United States prepared to enter WWII, the American military 
recognized it was ill prepared to successfully occupy parts of Europe, Asia, and 
North Africa.166 Because its officers knew little about government functions and 
local laws or customs, the U.S. military began training officers for military 
government duties in 1942.167 Although all prior successful American 
occupations were coordinated by the U.S. Army, President Franklin Roosevelt 
believed the Department of State was more suitable for “civilian matters.”168 By 
1943, however, the coordination of civil affairs stakeholders had proven difficult 
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for the Department of State, and President Roosevelt reverted responsibility for 
civil affairs back to the military.169 The U.S. Army—coordinating with non-military 
agencies and resources—remains the dominant overseer of civil affairs 
activity.170 
In its early developmental stages, civil affairs was regarded primarily as an 
option for post-conflict environments of military occupation. The world has 
changed, and the U.S. military has an increasingly significant role in disaster 
relief and humanitarian missions.171 Some civilian aid workers may view 
collaboration with military organizations as a “last resort,” but generally still 
recognize the benefits of leveraging government assets in crises.172 Civil affairs 
forces are now vital to the success of stability operations strategy across the 
spectrum of military conflicts; their primary task sectors include: 
Populace and resources control 
Foreign humanitarian assistance 
Nation assistance173 
Support to civil administration 
Civil information management174 
 
Organizationally, contemporary civil affairs units comprise both active and 
reserve members; reserve members make up the majority of civil affairs forces, 
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bringing specialized skills from their civilian professions.175 Reservists with 
training in civilian law enforcement, engineering, medical care, and other fields 
may be assigned civil affairs positions that leverage their expertise.176 These 
proficiencies align with common host-nation vulnerabilities in six areas of 
“functional specialty”: “rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health 
and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.”177 Personnel 
are then further assigned into civil affairs task sectors based upon their 
specialties. Elements of this strategy could be useful for homeland security 
agencies (subsequent chapters provide recommendations for similarly leveraging 
employee specialties). 
1. Civil Affairs Methodology 
Civil affairs techniques blend traditional military and counter-insurgency 
methods to support stability objectives and influence local populations. The U.S. 
Army field manual for civil affairs operations notes “nine principles of war” 
established in 1947 with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.178 Subsequent 
conflicts led to the addition of “three principles of operations,” and together they 
form the “twelve principles of joint operations”:  
Nine Principles of War  
1. Objective: “direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, 
decisive, and attainable objective.” 
2. Offensive: “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” 
3. Mass: “concentrate the efforts of combat power at the decisive 
place and time.” 
4. Economy of force: “allocate minimum essential combat power to 
secondary efforts.” 
                                            
175 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), 1-8. 
176 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 3-20. 
177 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), 1-8. 
178 Ibid., 1-8 – 1-11; Joint Publication 3-0 provides similar information on all twelve principles 
of joint operations, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0), Appendix A, 
A-1 – A-5. 
 49 
5. Maneuver: “place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through 
the flexible application of combat power.” 
6. Unity of Command: “for every objective, ensure unity of effort under 
one responsible commander.” 
7. Security: “never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected 
advantage…minimize cultural conflict with the civil population.” 
8. Surprise: “strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for 
which he is unprepared.” 
9. Simplicity: “prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise 
orders to ensure thorough understanding.”179 
Three Principles of Operations  
10. Perseverance: “ensure the commitment necessary to attain the 
national strategic end state.” 
11. Legitimacy: “develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the 
national strategic end state.” 
12. Restraint: “limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use 
of force.”180 
As noted in its U.S. Army field manual, civil affairs forces use these twelve 
analytical tools to plan and assess the success of civil affairs activities in stability 
operations.181 
These principles are foundationally important to civil affairs strategy and 
share commonalities with homeland security themes, as discussed in 
subsequent chapters. The principles help describe civil affairs’ emphasis on the 
needs of the local population, and on meeting their objectives while 
accommodating for cultural nuances.182 Further, the principles evaluate the state 
of infrastructure and civilian institutions, and the host government’s ability to 
provide conventional services. Civil affairs forces may support the host nation’s 
military or form a transitional military authority until a new legitimate government 
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is firmly established.183 This differs from U.S. domestic environments in which 
governmental structures are generally more predictable and stable. The 
challenges faced by civil affairs may arguably be greater than those confronting 
homeland security agencies. Figure 8 provides some examples of the 
vulnerabilities encountered by U.S. civil affairs forces during stability operations 
and available response options. 
Figure 8.  Civilian Vulnerabilities and Civil Affairs Response Options 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Protection of Civilians (ATP 3-07.6) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2015), 2-2, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/
dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x6.pdf. 
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2. Civil Affairs Challenges 
The responsibilities of civil affairs forces mimic primary tasks for stability 
operations: establishing civil security and control, and restoring essential 
services. These goals become more narrowly focused as military commanders 
delegate task-specific assignments to support broader objectives.184 In 
coordinating their stabilization efforts, civil affairs forces must consider the 
implications of their actions, particularly in the following areas:  
Overview of available resources 
Constraints on their use 
Alternatives for economic development 
Resources for immediate and long-term needs 
Interface among resource providers, indigenous government 
officials…and the peacekeeping force.185 
Civil affairs activities are decentralized by design, and impactful decisions are 
often made far below the command level. Civil affairs soldiers may be granted 
authority to take administrative actions, such as approving contracts for services, 
without the red tape typically found in government contracting.186 Military 
commanders laud the method as enabling a more expedient delivery of services 
and financial support. Most NGOs and charitable groups do not possess the 
resources to maintain long-term response in stability operations.187 
As in other areas of interagency and international military operations, 
coordinating civil affairs activities is a significant challenge.188 The circumstances 
that necessitate stability operations are chaotic, and there is often competition for 
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limited resources. Navigating complex, long-standing rivalries and cultural strife 
is no simple task. In some cases, extremist groups working against NGOs may 
have better funding sources and may be more organized.189 Civil affairs actions 
intend to mitigate these effects. The collaborative, decentralized design of civil 
affairs strategy encourages mutually beneficial partnerships with NGOs. 
Particularly in an environment of limited resources, collaboration in civil affairs 
aims to avoid duplicate effort and shifts responsibilities to suitable NGOs 
whenever possible. 
The decentralized approach to civil affairs is not without criticism. Notably, 
the methods are susceptible to corruption or incompetence. In Iraq, one aid 
group contended, “Soldiers are not development workers. There is industry skill, 
a body of knowledge that goes with it. You can’t just say ‘There’s a pothole over 
there and get it filled’ and fix a country.”190 The military cannot achieve long-term 
stabilization objectives alone. Civil affairs forces may be forced to operate 
outside their specialties, and collaboration can be a difficult art to master in 
unfamiliar territory. Even in domestic homeland security efforts, collaboration is 
often tenuous and elusive.  
3. Civil Affairs Benefits 
Stability operations are most effective when civil affairs units successfully 
collaborate to accomplish mission objectives. Commanders recognize citizens 
and NGOs are often more ideally suited for many tasks. One such leader, Lt. Col. 
Hank Arnold, stated, “At the end of the day I’m not a doctor, I’m not a 
construction expert. I’m an infantryman.”191 Nonetheless, Lt. Col. Arnold 
acknowledged potential benefits in local partners who are motivated by the 
presence of armed civil affairs forces acting as project managers.192 
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By minimizing the negative effects of military occupation on the local 
population and providing quality-of-life improvements, civil affairs forces 
contribute significantly to improving the host government’s legitimacy.193 Not 
unlike community partnerships with homeland security agencies, civil affairs 
forces must develop rapport with individuals and groups in the operating area to 
develop trust, gain credibility, and meet objectives. These relationships are 
leveraged through long-term collaborative security and stability objectives 
identified by the military commander and civilian advisors.194 
Given the complexity of interconnected affiliations, predicting the 
resources needed for civil affairs activities can be difficult.195 In fact, the number 
of civil affairs forces needed for stability operations is likely to exceed those 
required for traditional combat operations. Executing the long-term “hearts and 
minds” strategy generally requires more resources than armed combat.196 
Urbanization in fragile states and increasingly large population centers 
creates challenging deployment environments for civil affairs forces in stability 
operations.197 Because of these challenges, civil affairs troops are most effective 
in smaller, regional deployments. Some countries are simply too large for civil 
affairs forces to effectively execute a stability operations strategy.198 The impact 
of this principle on local homeland security efforts is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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C. CASE STUDY 
1. The British Approach to Civil Affairs 
The British use of civil affairs in stability operations is similarly intended to 
organize, restore, and maintain basic government functions through collaboration 
with local citizenry.199 An early summary of British civil affairs methodology 
described its design: “In the broadest of terms the object was to create and put 
into the field a temporary administrative pyramid, military in person, outlook, and 
loyalties, but predominantly civil in function.”200 
The origins of British civil affairs tactics can also be traced to military plans 
for the Allied occupation of Europe during WWII. Prior to WWII, British military 
personnel often built roads or engaged in other temporary support missions. 
These tasks were carried out independently as an informal response to imminent 
needs, and soldiers resumed traditional military duties after completing the 
temporary assignment.201 The nature of conflict in WWII compelled the 
development of civil affairs specialties to meet vital security objectives—
particularly the need for civil governance in occupied European territories.202 
Allied strategy was influenced by the British desire to distinguish between 
methods for overseeing friendly and hostile territories.203 Many friendly territories 
had civil governments in exile, and Allied stabilization efforts in those areas were 
based on the people’s consent rather than forceful occupation.204 British civil 
affairs troops in WWII were assigned a wide range of tasks: medical, agricultural, 
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administrative, logistical, cultural (such as securing art), and protective (of 
communications infrastructure).205 Their assignments were intended to resolve 
significant civil issues before they complicated military activities. They 
accomplished these goals through formal interactions and partnerships between 
civilian populations and military forces. 
As noted previously, U.S. civil affairs administration during WWII was 
sometimes beleaguered by confusion between the Departments of State and 
Defense. In contrast, the British clearly defined “where responsibility should lie 
for the administration of territories” within a formal military chain of command.206 
However, British civil affairs forces were granted wide discretion and day-to-day 
activities were notably decentralized.207 In contrast, U.S.-led civil affairs efforts in 
Italy emphasized civilian political oversight that was deliberately separate from 
military supervision.208 The approach in Italy supported continuity in public policy 
through civilians with experience in political governance rather than military 
command.209 
The British found the Italian approach to civil affairs untenable and crafted 
their policy differently. British civil affairs efforts demonstrated a commitment to 
military governance in collaboration with local populations. Specifically, the 
British wanted to improve accountability, make better use of limited resources, 
and use military administration to minimize political meddling.210 Rather than 
creating redundant civilian organizations, British civil affairs would be 
administered through a military chain of command.211 In the U.S. military, the 
role of civil affairs has progressively evolved and remains a key tactic in stability 
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operations.212 By contrast, British civil affairs was mothballed in the 1950s, when 
it was deemed either unnecessary in a post-WWII context or redundant to other 
multi-national efforts. Civil affairs operations were nevertheless reintroduced to 
the British military in the 1990s as part of stability operations in Bosnia.213 
British civil affairs troops are drawn from both reserve and active forces 
and are deployed together; this contrasts with American civil affairs, in which the 
two elements remain separate.214 U.S. stabilization doctrine places stability 
operations strategy and its civil affairs forces on equal footing with other, more 
traditional, offensive and defensive military elements.215 The role of civil affairs in 
British stability operations strategy is more ambiguous.216 Despite this, the post-
9/11 rise of Iraq insurgencies led to heightened interest in successful British 
strategies. 
Some research examines the success of British counterinsurgency 
strategy during the Malayan Emergency in the mid-20th Century as a potential 
model for civil affairs forces in Iraq.217 Favorable views of British operations in 
Malaya highlight sensitivity to local cultures and topography, integration of civil-
military interests, and an inclination toward “strategic patience” as a means of 
building legitimacy with minimum force.218 Similarly, counter-insurgency strategy 
has been deliberately applied in U.S. domestic law enforcement, exemplified in 
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the Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing model in Massachusetts.219 British 
and U.S. civil affairs incorporate counter-insurgency techniques to win hearts and 
minds in a manner similar to the C3 policing model. Regardless of its military or 
domestic application, key to the civil affairs strategy is recognizing and adapting 
to cultural nuances. Civil affairs activity in Iraq is different than in Haiti or 
Afghanistan, as would domestic applications in New York City be different from 
those in rural America. Different populations have different needs; local 
operations and objectives tailored to the citizens. 
One U.S. Army strategist, Lt. Col. Wade Markel, examined British 
strategies in Malaya, commenting: “There is nothing controversial about 
combating an insurgency by improving the lot of the population.”220 However, as 
with any military action, “success” depends on perspective, and British 
counterinsurgency strategies in Malaya were prone to maltreatment. While the 
British endeavored to win “hearts and minds” in Malaya, they also interred the 
minority Chinese population from which insurgents arose. Similar to its activities 
in Malaya, British counterinsurgency strategy during uprisings in Kenya led to the 
imprisonment and abuse of ethnic minorities. Although these actions successfully 
defeated the insurgency, the ethnic abuses caused scandals that accelerated 
independence from British colonialism.221 
Despite the potential for abuse, physical population control remains a 
favorable practice in British civil affairs and counterinsurgency tactics. Control 
measures may range from identity cards and other administrative methods to 
forced internment. Lt. Col. Markel suggests that British actions in Malaya and 
Kenya could be applied to contemporary stability operations in Iraq, provided 
they are adjusted to the cultural environment and international laws.222 However, 
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he also contends that the British experience in Kenya “supports the troubling 
conclusion that it is control of a given population, and not cultural sensitivity 
toward it, that was the decisive aspect of the British practice of 
counterinsurgency.”223 This conclusion is at odds with civil affairs strategy, and 
with many homeland security efforts designed to gain support from citizens. 
However, Malaya and Kenya represent extremely dire circumstances not often 
experienced in American domestic history.224 
Lt. Col. Markel asserts that the British strategy of “winning hearts and 
minds” may be less consequential than suppressing dissent.225 This 
recommendation is tempered by the realization that these methods are most 
effective when an uprising is isolated to a small segment of the population. Even 
then, success is by no means guaranteed. Contemporary examples demonstrate 
the challenge of population control in fragile states. One such example is South 
Sudan, an area rocked by civil war and continued instability despite U.N. 
attempts at “voluntary internment” as a means of population control. Critics of 
U.N. actions in South Sudan cite a lack of civilian engagement and exit strategy, 
a forte of British civil affairs methodology.226 
These lessons appear to have influenced present iterations of British civil 
affairs. The modern-day British civil affairs renaissance blends distinct elements 
of “counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building” into 
stability operations.227 Within that doctrine, the British reintroduced civil affairs 
forces with four primary motivations: 
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1. The complexity of responding to civilian problems in areas where 
the military operated with other elements 
2. A necessity to engage humanitarian and community improvement 
organizations in operational theaters 
3. A stable administration of government would provide an acceptable 
exit strategy 
4. A political need for credible humanitarian efforts as part of military 
operations228 
While U.S. civil affairs policy emphasizes military priorities, British civil 
affairs design stresses the tactical benefits of relationships that support 
humanitarian needs and principles.229 The method for achieving this goal is 
working more effectively with “local, national, and international civil agencies.”230 
Similar to U.S. civil affairs, the British approach helps set goals and redeploy 
resources once an area of responsibility has improved. 
Present-day British civil affairs policy reflects a “comprehensive approach” 
for stabilizing civilian areas through “cost-effective, plausible, and feasible 
operations.”231 Unlike its Italian equivalent, which uses a civilian-led approach, 
British civil affairs strategy manages the diverse disciplines through a military 
chain of command and operates under a centralized stabilization policy.232 
British civil affairs strategy continues to be used in recent conflicts and operates 
under a mandate to demonstrate “a holistic, politically focused strategic approach 
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to intervention.”233 British civil affairs methods are intended to reflect the value of 
negotiation with civilian partners within the context of stability operations.234 
2. Analysis 
The evolution of British stability operations policy and subsequent 
refinements in civil affairs practices are relevant to our own security 
discussions.235 British civil affairs methods are rooted in counterinsurgency 
strategy. Some aspects of these practices have been beneficial, while others 
offer a cautionary deterrent. The British approach to stabilization through civil 
affairs is pragmatic, and offers a flexible model for regional stability. However, 
particular methods, such as wholesale internment and selective protection, are 
not ideal for consideration in U.S. society. British civil affairs practices focus on 
political goals at home and abroad. This attention to public perception may be 
useful for consideration in an American system of homeland security. 
While British civil affairs began as a system of military governance, it 
evolved into one component within a system of stability operations. The current 
British approach to counter-terrorism strategy provides an interesting analogy 
with its civil affairs practices. Current British counter-terrorism policies, referred to 
as CONTEST, are designed around four key objectives: pursue, prevent, protect, 
and prepare.236 These goals note a foundational obligation to “human rights and 
rule of law” and transparency in protecting the United Kingdom, although similar 
commitments are not accentuated in British civil affairs or counterinsurgency 
strategy.237 Perhaps such emphases are understandable, but the inference is 
that protection of British interests is tantamount. While there has been some 
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debate about the success of British prevention efforts, CONTEST touts the lack 
of attacks during the London Olympics with anecdotal evidence of arrests and 
foiled terror plots.238 
The British experiences in Malaya and Kenya are useful comparisons to 
engagements in Iraq and elsewhere. The methods used in these countries 
highlight the challenges in exporting military systems to a system of American 
democracy. British civil affairs strategy does provide a beneficial contrast for 
organizing collaboration into local homeland security efforts. Domestic efforts to 
stabilize communities and respond to disasters may be more effective by 
considering the British approach to citizen engagement. However, it must be 
recognized that these successes often came at the expense of minority 
populations and in a manner unacceptable for U.S. homeland security practices. 
As a result of extensive deployments and lessons learned, British civil 
affairs tactics have changed. Refinements resulted in nine primary objectives for 
civil affairs forces supporting stability operations: 
1. Place political purpose first: political goals guide planning and 
desired outcomes. 
2. Understand the context: situational awareness is necessary for 
success. 
3. Focus on the population: the needs of the population must be met 
to promote security and gain consensus. 
4. Foster civil authority and indigenous capacity: empower community 
ownership in their own security. 
5. Unify effort: force is only one element to achieve security and 
stabilization objectives, and coordinated operations are vital to 
security. 
6. Isolate and neutralize irregular actors: reduce opposition to 
irrelevancy. 
7. Exploit credibility to gain support: foster sentiments of legitimacy 
and credibility toward government. 
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8. Prepare for the long term: sustainable stability will take 
considerable time and requires an early commitment to persevere. 
9. Anticipate, learn, and adapt: complex challenges and adversaries 
demand preparation and versatile responses.239 
These nine objectives share many similarities with U.S. civil affairs doctrine. 
Table 3 compares current British civil affairs objectives with joint operations 
principles used by U.S. civil affairs forces. 
Table 3.   British Civil Affairs Objectives and U.S. Joint Operations 
Principles 
British Civil Affairs Objectives U.S. Joint Operations Principles 
Primacy of political purpose Objective 
Understand the context Maneuver 
Focus on the population Security 
Foster governance, authority, and 
civil capacity Economy of force 
Unity of effort Unity of command 
Isolate and neutralize irregular 
actors Offensive, Mass, Surprise 
Exploit credibility to gain support Legitimacy, Restraint 
Prepare for the long haul Perseverance 
Anticipate, learn, and adapt Simplicity 
British objectives adapted from Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation: The Military 
Contribution (JDP 3-40) (Wiltshire, England: Ministry of Defense, November 2009), 59–67, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/
jdp3_40a4.pdf. 
U.S. principles adapted from Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57) 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), 1–8 – 1–10, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.  
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Two of the British recommendations offer strongly worded but noteworthy 
distinctions from U.S. civil affairs methodology. The “primacy of political purpose” 
succinctly ascribes the strategic intent toward political accountability, whereas 
U.S. civil affairs strategy avoids overt political influences. The British commitment 
to “isolate and neutralize irregular actors” may indicate a willingness to go 
beyond the limits of U.S. strategy.240 Perhaps these semantics suggest lingering 
effects influenced by British successes in Malaya and Kenya and desire to 
duplicate similar victories in Iraq.241 These two recommendations should be 
approached cautiously, but offer an interesting contrast to U.S. civil affairs policy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Subtle differences between the U.S. and British approaches to civil affairs 
offer suggestions for American homeland security applications. Developing an 
exit strategy, for example, intends to establish British legitimacy not only with the 
local population and other stakeholders, but also with British citizens.242 This 
modest nuance may be beneficial to a U.S. culture that values inclusiveness. 
U.S. civil affairs strategy is focused on its role within stability operations and does 
not appear overtly concerned with the opinions of American citizens. U.S. civil 
affairs policy concentrates on the community in which it is deployed. 
Less subtle is the concept that internment or wanton control of minority 
populations may be beneficial to stability operations. While these types of 
physical control may be tolerated in times of war, they certainly warn ethical 
sensibilities and would likely violate American laws. Perhaps the British 
recognize this also. While their civil affairs objectives offer some latitude in 
foreign deployments, British counter-terrorism strategies reflect a more 
conservative approach in their own territories; as the policy states, “We do not 
believe it is possible to resolve the threats we face simply by arresting and 
                                            
240 Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation (JDP 3-40) 57, 63–64. 
241 Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 46. 
242 Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 10. 
 64 
prosecuting more people.”243 These sentiments are analogous to ongoing 
debates about U.S. homeland security practices, particularly in state and local 
law enforcement, which is explored in the next chapter. Gaining civilian support is 
paramount in both civil affairs and homeland security. 
Although U.S. civil affairs forces are most often deployed in foreign 
environments, there appears to be some basis for civil affairs’ applicability in 
domestic homeland security efforts. Specifically, the “twelve objectives for joint 
operations” provide a helpful framework for stabilizing American communities, 
and are revisited in policy recommendations for homeland security efforts. U.S. 
military policy notes that civil affairs forces can be deployed domestically to 
support civil authorities.244 Chapter IV examines civil-military operations and 
other areas of homeland security in which stability operations strategy and the 
civil affairs model may be relevant. 
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IV. HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVES
The quest for homeland security is heading…toward the quasi-
militarization of everyday life…. If danger might lurk anywhere, 
maybe everything must be protected and policed. 
—William Greider, national affairs correspondent, The Nation 
U.S. homeland security remains an industry in flux, responding to outside 
threats and inside changes in public expectations.245 Private citizens, NGOs, 
politicians, businesses, and public safety agencies continue to debate the best 
options for protecting our country. In that context, a significant number of citizens 
believe government is not sensitive to public expectations and safety needs. 
Response efforts during natural disasters have been criticized. Police agencies 
have been particularly scrutinized for inadequate community outreach and 
controversial use of force. On the other hand, critical infrastructure may not be 
given enough attention in homeland security deliberations. Organization of state 
and local homeland security efforts varies significantly by jurisdiction, with no 
common methodology. In February 2001, a government commission assessed 
America’s homeland security strategy, finding: 
The U.S. government is not well organized, for example, to ensure 
homeland security. No adequate coordination mechanism exists 
among federal, state, and local government efforts…Strategic 
planning is absent in the U.S. government…nor can resources be 
allocated efficiently to reflect changes in policy priorities.246 
Although much has changed since 9/11, a similar assessment could be 
made of present-day homeland security efforts. After 9/11, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to improve the coordination of federal, 
245 Kahan, “Never Too Late.” 
246 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National 
Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/
PhaseIIIFR.pdf.  
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state, and local government agencies against security threats.247 Significant 
strides have been made in national homeland security prevention and response 
plans through DHS and its component, FEMA. However, state and local 
homeland security agencies generally lack a comprehensive strategy to unify 
their efforts.  
Homeland security leaders should be willing to consider all legal options to 
protect citizens. This chapter discusses some of these possibilities, including 
better coordination between U.S. military and homeland security resources. The 
intent is to demonstrate an ongoing precedent for incorporating military strategy 
into homeland security efforts. Given trends toward civil-military collaboration, 
stability operations strategy may be an even more reasonable alternative for 
homeland security. Further, this chapter examines areas of state and local 
homeland security efforts in which the decentralized, community-focused model 
of stability operations strategy may be beneficial. Specifically, this chapter 
discusses homeland security initiatives and domestic lines of effort within the 
context of four major stabilization objectives: unity of effort, conflict 
transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests.248 Aspects of 
each area translate into policy option recommendations in Chapter V. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
This chapter accepts that the pursuit of domestic tranquility is undoubtedly 
complex. The execution of military stability operations strategy is similarly 
challenging. This author realizes that volumes have been written on homeland 
security, civil-military cooperation, and related topics. This chapter does not 
reveal new secrets; it aims simply to highlight areas of homeland security in 
which stabilization strategy may be beneficial. 
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This author also assumes that securing our homeland remains a principal 
responsibility of the government, and the execution of related duties will never be 
perfect. Although this chapter certainly does not resolve the challenges facing 
homeland security, it accepts there is room for improvement. Many critics agree; 
for instance, journalist William Greider published an article in 2004 criticizing 
post-9/11 homeland security efforts: 
So far more than $120 billion in new spending has been devoted to 
constructing domestic protections, but each new project merely 
demonstrates how incomplete the homeland security system is—
and how impossible an airtight defense would be for an open and 
free society…So government is pushed to formulate larger and 
more grandiose plans…to ward off more of the infinite possibilities, 
just in case.249 
Greider and other skeptics underscore the gargantuan task of homeland security, 
and other cynical descriptions of homeland security affairs could be made today. 
Much has been done, but there remains a startling lack of consensus—
particularly in prevention strategies. This chapter does not intend to suggest yet 
another grandiose plan. Instead, this author assumes existing military strategy 
may be able to unify and leverage current resources more successfully than 
present-day methods. 
Many unsettled questions remain, even regarding what activities fall within 
the purview of “homeland security.”250 This chapter does not attempt to resolve 
such debates, but suggests initiatives that may be incorporated into a 
comprehensive homeland security stabilization strategy. The chapter paints with 
an admittedly broad brush, and assumes a decentralized strategy such as 
stability operations may be more palatable to homeland security critics. 
Certainly, the nature of American democracy presents challenges for 
homeland security organizations. Safeguarding the public within the confines of 
                                            
249 Greider, “Under the Banner,” 14. 
250 Fire services, police departments, and emergency management may be widely accepted 
as homeland security efforts. The inclusion of other professions (public health, cyber-security, 
schools, code enforcement, utilities, etc.) varies significantly by jurisdiction. 
 68 
U.S. laws while balancing community expectations is demanding work. However, 
the use of military strategy in homeland security activities is not a novel concept; 
this author assumes history provides a reasonable precedent. The chapter 
begins with an abbreviated summary of U.S. civil-military collaborative efforts to 
stabilize the homeland. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION 
The American system of democracy embraces an intrinsic tension 
between co-existing federal, state, and local governments. One might think 
homeland security agencies are less inclined to cooperate with U.S. military 
assets, as noted by researcher Donald Kettl: 
At the core of the problem are two issues: America’s historical 
tradition of local self-government…and the technical difficulty of 
setting and enforcing standards, for intergovernmental programs in 
general and emergency services in particular.251 
Despite these views, the U.S. military remains an active partner in homeland 
security efforts and actually has a long history of supporting domestic 
agencies.252 American military strategy and resources may be well suited for use 
in homeland security, yet underutilized by state and local homeland security 
agencies.253 While military assistance is often welcomed during disaster 
response or public health crises, military commanders and civilian officials have 
generally been reluctant to deploy American armed forces in law enforcement 
roles on U.S. soil.254 Nonetheless, a perceived hesitancy to utilize military 
resources domestically may be a relatively recent phenomenon.255 
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Prior to the advent of professional law enforcement agencies, American 
military personnel served as the primary community peacekeeping force.256 
President George Washington personally led an army of thirteen thousand to 
quell civil disorder during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.257 U.S. Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Diehl describes the expanding role of our military on the 
Western frontier: 
The Army build roads, bridges, and frontier communities, it fought 
with Indians, outlaws, and terrorists; it kept the peace across 
enormous expanses of territory, settled labor disputes, and assisted 
communities in the wake of natural disasters.258 
The role of the U.S. military has continued to expand. Since the end of 
WWII, the United States has maintained a larger domestic military presence, 
whose role evolved to include support for civil authorities.259 Contemporary 
American military policy affords significant latitude for supporting homeland 
security activity, particularly for National Guard troops; state governors have 
frequently used their legal authority to activate National Guard troops for 
homeland defense.260 During the 2012 fiscal year, for example, National Guard 
troops responded to more than one hundred natural disaster missions and 
conducted at least seven thousand different counterdrug operations with federal, 
state, and local homeland security partners (see Figure 9 for an example).261 
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Figure 9.  Louisiana National Guard and Civilian Police Joint Exercise 
 
Louisiana National Guard and civilian police participate in a joint disaster-response training 
exercise. Source: Rashawn Price and Tarell Bilbo, “La. Guard Participates in Disaster Response 
Exercise,” Louisiana National Guard, accessed March 19, 2016, http://geauxguard.la.gov/la-guard-
participates-in-disaster-response-exercise-state-agencies-conduct-joint-training-in-new-orleans-
area-hackberry/.  
These activities represent a significant level of support to civil authorities, 
particularly law enforcement agencies. The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 
United States, published by the DOD’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlines policies for 
all American military personnel: 
We also have a long history of military support for national goals 
short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation 
(such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a 
wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all 
military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote 
the national security and protect our national interests.262 
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A 2013 update of the same publication notes the importance of DOD agencies 
operating with “associated civilians supporting governmental and private sector 
workforces.”263 American laws also provide explicit allowances for military 
involvement in disaster response, law enforcement activities, and other 
homeland security functions.264 Some of these roles continue to be scrutinized, 
particularly when military units are deployed during civil disturbances.265 
Similar to U.S. stabilization and civil affairs strategy, military assets in civil-
military operations are ideally restricted to support roles.266 During disaster 
response, it may be less controversial for military assets to take a primary role. 
Tasking military personnel with domestic law enforcement missions has been 
problematic, and they are more ideally limited to roles supporting federal, state, 
and local initiatives.267 
The importance of civil-military coordination is also evident in other areas 
of homeland security policy. Public Law 100-707, commonly referred to as the 
Stafford Act, provides statutory authority for FEMA and other agencies during 
disaster response with civil authorities.268 NORTHCOM was established in 2002 
to organize DOD “homeland defense efforts and coordinate defense support of 
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civil authorities.”269 Both NORTHCOM and FEMA conduct annual collaborative 
exercises with federal, state, and local agencies.270 
The United States has a long history of—and clear domestic mandate 
for—military support of homeland security agencies. Civil-military collaboration 
may be particularly visible during disasters and unrest, but regular support for 
ongoing homeland security initiatives is not uncommon.271 While these efforts 
may be more widely accepted during large-scale crises, the integration of military 
strategy and homeland security activity occurred long ago. This civil-military 
collaboration precedent makes the possibility of incorporating stability operations 
strategy into homeland security activities more plausible. The remainder of this 
chapter briefly examines homeland security initiatives using four major stability 
operations objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule 
of law, and security interests. 
C. STABILITY OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
1. Unity of Effort 
The term “unity of effort” appears frequently in homeland security and 
military literature, but is often an elusive goal.272 Stability operations and civil 
affairs strategy are impossible to execute if stakeholders act independently and 
without coordination. Unity of effort through shared collaboration is foundational 
to stability operations, civil affairs activities, and successful homeland security 
strategies. In 2003, the DHS was created primarily to unify FEMA and twenty-one 
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other agencies into a single entity.273 Stability operations and civil affairs suggest 
an alternative strategy for coordinating and unifying homeland security efforts, 
particularly for state and local jurisdictions. 
As noted previously, civil-military cooperation in homeland security is 
ongoing, but more significant partnerships are possible. The U.S. National 
Guard’s mission is to “defend America at home and abroad,” and homeland 
security agencies could likely increase collaboration in support of their shared 
domestic objectives.274 In 2006, researcher Glen Woodbury noted the scarcity of 
shared prevention plans in homeland security, commenting, “It is impossible to 
‘train’ to a standard, practice, or precedent that does not exist.”275 Similarly, 
author Donald Kettl notes the ongoing challenges in creating a balanced, unified 
approach to homeland security strategy.276 By 2014, every U.S. state and 
territorial government had created an agency intended to unify state and/or local 
security efforts.277 Training drills such as FEMA’s National Exercise Program and 
NORTHCOM’s Vibrant Response represent some progress in preparative 
collaboration between federal, state, and local homeland security resources. 
Denoting further advancement in homeland security models, FEMA developed 
the National Preparedness System to provide a model for disaster preparedness, 
as illustrated in Figure 10.278 
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Figure 10.  National Preparedness System 
 
Source: “National Preparedness System,” FEMA, accessed March 19, 
2016, https://emilms.fema.gov/IS230c/assets/THIRA_s26.png.  
However, many other efforts to unify homeland security strategy 
emphasize response rather than prevention. The National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) provides a template for managing incidents, and is widely used 
by many homeland security agencies.279 The National Response Framework 
(NRF) provides a “scalable, flexible, and adaptable” guide for coordinating civilian 
and government responses to “all types of disasters and emergencies.”280 FEMA 
intends for the NIMS and NRF to help the “whole community…save lives, protect 
property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human 
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needs following an incident.”281 FEMA provides guidance for unified “whole 
community” efforts, which logically focus on community response and resiliency 
during disasters.282 In military terms, most of these plans are designed for a 
post-conflict environment. While the NIMS, NRF, and whole community models 
provide useful recommendations for disaster response, they generally do not 
include suggestions for long-term prevention.283 
The NRF and whole community models are designed to improve 
community resiliency, which, if successful, may provide some preventative 
benefits in deterring future attacks.284 These FEMA models distinguish between 
response and prevention plans. In contrast, Israeli models use rapid crisis 
response as a preventative deterrence strategy. The Israeli response to terror 
attacks intends to restore community routines as quickly as possible to 
discourage additional attacks and demonstrate its population’s resiliency.285 
Stability operations strategy has been used in a wide range of environments, and 
could incorporate existing FEMA prevention and response efforts into a unified 
strategy. 
Unity of effort in homeland security activities may have some limitations. 
For example, from 2002 to 2012, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted joint intelligence operations 
intended to “thwart terrorist activities.”286 Some community members felt this 
type of collaborative relationship was improper, commenting that “the CIA is 
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teaching NYPD an unwarranted counterinsurgency mentality” (see Figure 11).287 
Although the program was determined to be legal, both agencies concluded the 
“close and direct collaboration” led to a perception that the CIA had “exceeded its 
authorities.”288 In this case, there was too much teamwork. 
Figure 11.  Protest against NYPD-CIA Surveillance Program 
 
In 2013, protestors alleged NYPD-CIA surveillance operations targeted Muslim communities. 
Source: Faiza Patel, “Brooklyn Is Not Baghdad: What Is the CIA Teaching the NYPD?” Defense 
One, August 2013, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-cia-teaching-nypd/68789/. 
In other cases, homeland security agencies have been criticized for too 
little collaboration. A recent after-action assessment of civil unrest in Ferguson, 
Missouri, highlighted a lack of “proactive strategy” which contributed to a lack of 
continuity in policing.289 The report sharply criticized the lack of a unified law 
enforcement strategy and failure to operate according to NIMS guidelines, and 
concluded multiple agencies failed to focus on key objectives.290 Some of these 
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criticisms could be improved with a unified stability operations strategy and 
implemented preemptively using the civil affairs model. Identifying the proper 
collaborative balance remains a challenge. Specific goals and objectives must be 
defined early, or it will be difficult to ascertain the impact of unified efforts. 
2. Conflict Transformation 
Increased collaboration in homeland security can have varying results. 
Transforming communities struck by disaster or fraught with violence is a difficult 
task, and each locale presents unique circumstances and challenges. The 
community-focused stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs 
suggests key objectives for transforming conflict and disaster environments 
through homeland security intervention. Early civil affairs methodology notes 
several principles worthy of consideration in the context of transformative 
homeland security efforts: 
The primary purpose is restoration of long-term political and economic 
vitality.291 
“Military and humanitarian considerations are not necessarily opposed to 
each other, though they may be so at times…at those times military 
necessity must be the prime consideration.”292 
“Military government is best which governs least.”293 
 
These principles echo similar emphases in homeland security efforts to 
bring communities affected by violence or disaster back to peace and stability. 
Effective homeland security efforts and community expectations require 
balancing the natural tension between “hard” and “soft” power strategies.294 
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Stability operations strategy prefers civilian rather than military governments, and 
the similar goal of homeland security is for communities to sustain 
themselves.295 As suggested in the civil affairs model, the necessity of hard and 
soft power actions can be alleviated through community partnerships.296 
Contemporary homeland security agencies are often fundamentally dedicated to 
resolving conflict or tragedy. These values could be incorporated into a stability 
operations strategy to ensure transformative efforts are measured and assessed 
in keeping with stabilization objectives. 
There have been many different approaches in the United States to 
stabilize neighborhoods, improve a floundering economy, or reduce violent crime. 
In their “broken windows” theory, criminologists James Wilson and George 
Kelling suggested police departments address low-level crimes and blight to 
transform troubled communities.297 Community policing evolved to address 
problems identified by citizens, but still demonstrates an inherently narrow focus 
on crime-related issues. 
Contemporary homeland security efforts have also expanded to include 
other strategies. NIMS merged tactics from fire service, military operations, and 
emergency management.298 In Massachusetts, military counter-insurgency 
(COIN) strategy was used to develop the C3 Policing model.299 The plan 
adapted U.S. military COIN techniques for use in civilian policing, emphasizing 
community relationships. Similar to community policing, the C3 model uses “hard 
power” COIN strategies to “separate gangs from their cause and support.”300 C3 
Policing differs from traditional community policing by using existing resources in 
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a long-term approach to attack root causes and reduce crime “through citizen 
involvement” (see Figure 12).301 The C3 crime-fighting methodology also 
concentrates on relationships with other police departments and community 
groups. Understandably, this model focuses on transforming crime-plagued 
neighborhoods from a law enforcement perspective. Generally speaking, the C3 
model does not appear to integrate other homeland security stakeholders in 
efforts to resolve conflict.302 
Figure 12.  Police and Community Discuss C3 Policing Strategy 
 
Community stakeholders and Massachusetts police plan collaborative initiatives in 2013. 
Source: Massachusetts State Police, accessed March 19, 2016, http://mspc3policing.com/wp-
content/gallery/c3-policing_1/anvil-4-0-web-001.jpg. 
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When applied to homeland security initiatives, stability operations strategy 
and civil affairs move a step further than C3 Policing. While the shared focus 
remains on long-term sustainable transformation, stability operations strategy 
offers a broader, more scalable framework for incorporating other homeland 
security areas. C3 aims to change hearts and minds using COIN techniques 
adapted for civilian application, but this tactic may not be sufficient. Similar 
homeland security efforts to counter violent extremism and dissuade youths from 
gang involvement suggest a more integrated approach is necessary.303 
There are many examples of efforts to address poverty, education 
opportunity, racial injustice, and unemployment in order to transform challenged 
communities. Indeed, civil affairs strategy uses many of these same initiatives. 
However, some argue these efforts are likely to succeed only when they are part 
of a comprehensive framework.304 Researchers Shannon Green and Daniel 
Runde contend that successful efforts must focus on systemic challenges and be 
“designed intentionally, with deep knowledge about the local drivers and specific 
interventions targeting those risk factors.”305 Stability operations strategy uses 
civil affairs personnel to address these types of localized issues.306 
Recommendations made in the Ferguson after-action report, for example, cite 
poverty, racial prejudice, systemic inequality in legal proceedings, and 
unsatisfactory community engagement.307 Much like the British approach to 
counter-terrorism, systemic issues are not resolved simply by making more 
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arrests.308 Efforts to reform policing may be needed, and communities have 
demanded a more comprehensive overhaul.309 
The U.S. military has placed stability operations strategy on par with 
offensive and defensive activity. Stability operations strategy offers a model for 
conflict transformation and for addressing systemic problems. Homeland security 
has similarly shifted its focus toward systemic issues and conflict prevention. For 
example, some jurisdictions have chosen to direct resources toward food 
insecurity, abandoned homes, or the mental health system as part of their 
security strategy. Traditional homeland security services, such as law 
enforcement, remain intact but are linked more closely with other community 
initiatives.310 Contemporary homeland security agencies may have similar 
objectives as in years past, but are perhaps open to more comprehensive 
approaches in transforming affected communities. 
3. Legitimacy and Rule of Law 
In stability operations, achievements in unity of effort and conflict 
transformation should result in improved community sentiments regarding 
government legitimacy and rule of law. Civil affairs strategy has been referred to 
as “armed social work,” as it focuses on non-combat initiatives and emphasizes 
support for local efforts to improve legitimacy.311 Skepticism about homeland 
security efforts is particularly robust in regards to law enforcement and other 
areas of the U.S. criminal justice system. Law professor Craig Futterman, an 
expert on police misconduct, explains: “If we have even the slightest chance of 
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being effective and solving violent crime, getting cooperation and help and 
partnership from people in the community, there’s got to be trust.”312 
This critique is not a recent phenomenon. In 1974, criminologist Paul 
Tagaki warned that the United States was becoming a “garrison state” and 
argued police officers should be disarmed to prevent disproportionate killing of 
minorities.313 Similar current criticism argues for “mutual de-escalation” between 
citizens and police with improved government accountability.314 Recent 
community protests have challenged legitimacy in homeland security by alleging 
that minorities are “systematically and intentionally targeted.”315 
Debates regarding legitimacy in law enforcement often highlight the 
difficult task of balancing security needs and public perception. For example, 
President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing released a 116-page 
report outlining key recommendations to improve legitimacy in policing, including:  
Establish community-based initiatives to address fundamental issues such 
as poverty, education, health, and safety. 
Make the community safe while at the same time building trust. 
Establish a culture of transparency and accountability. 
Reduce crime by improving relationships, increasing community 
engagement, and fostering cooperation. 
Focus on positive non-enforcement activities as a way to reach out to the 
community. 
Use community policing as a “guiding philosophy.”316 
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The renewed call for community-focused policing methods take a skeptical 
view of traditional policing methods. These proposals specifically challenge law 
enforcement organizations to focus on non-enforcement, akin to civil affairs’ 
deference in nontraditional military outreach to communities.317 As homeland 
security continues to evolve, there have been robust criticisms of “militarization” 
in domestic law enforcement. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and 
other community organizations have been critical of perceived military-style 
tactics and equipment. In their report War Comes Home: The Excessive 
Militarization of American Policing, the ACLU argues, “Militarization of policing 
encourages officers to adopt a ‘warrior’ mentality and think of the people they are 
supposed to serve as enemies.”318 Notably, the title of the ACLU report seems to 
infer that perhaps some militarization may be acceptable, provided it is not 
“excessive.” 
Other areas of homeland security are being similarly stretched beyond 
their customs. These types of challenges may be ideally suited for a strategic 
community-focused framework such as that offered by stability operations. 
Discussions of legitimacy in homeland security often highlight changing 
community expectations of practitioners and redefined agency missions.319 For 
example, various groups continue to demand increased oversight and debate 
whether police officers should be “warriors” or “guardians.”320 Some have called 
for law enforcement to emphasize a defensive posture, offering, “While [police] 
must acquire the skills and capacity to be a warrior in some occasions, their 
primary focus is to build relationships with the community they serve.”321 
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Even police organizations and practitioners disagree among themselves 
about appropriate use of force policies and their impact on legitimacy.322 One 
police professional was unhappy with the presidential task force 
recommendations, describing the report’s findings as “fantasy that law 
enforcement causes criminality…if only we can change the police we can stop 
poverty, crime, gangs, etc.”323 The International Association of Chiefs of Police 
argues that police policies should align with legal standards established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.324 The Police Executive Research Forum contends law 
enforcement best practices should reflect even higher standards than legally 
required to improve community perceptions and legitimacy.325 
Using a stability operations strategy, homeland security agencies could 
use existing organizational structures to identify community needs, develop and 
implement outreach efforts, and improve legitimacy. Civil affairs activities are 
based upon critical needs identified by the community, similar to what some U.S. 
communities are demanding.326 Homeland security agencies can also positively 
impact legitimacy by supporting efforts of NGOs rather than depleting limited 
homeland security resources with duplicative efforts. Strategic partnerships allow 
homeland security agencies to focus on their primary missions while improving 
relationships with stakeholders and enhancing the rule of law. 
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4. Security Interests 
Particularly at the state and local level, homeland security agencies 
provide some of the most visible government services. As in other parts of the 
world, the United States. views certain basic services as essential for the security 
of its population. Government leaders are often mandated to provide services or 
maintain infrastructure in keeping with community security interests and 
expectations. In some cases, government functions may be unnecessarily 
redundant or better suited for partnership with NGOs who provide similar 
services. Critical infrastructure is often provided or regulated by government 
entities. For example, water and electric utilities may not play a prominent role in 
homeland security discussions—until a critical failure occurs. As in civil affairs, 
U.S. homeland security leaders should assess the security interests of their 
stakeholders and engage them in a unified homeland security strategy.327 
U.S. homeland security agencies engage in a wide variety of activities to 
improve community relations, build legitimacy, and improve neighborhoods. As 
depicted in Figure 13, journalist Paul Myers opined that the United States should 
be more committed to security interests in its own communities before engaging 
in stabilization efforts abroad.328 
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Figure 13.  Internet Meme Pans U.S. Commitment to Domestic Stability 
 
This Internet meme was based upon a tweet by journalist and author Paul Myers, see 
https://twitter.com/pulmyears/status/101065729817841665. Source: http://tinyurl.com/
h24cnyz. 
Myers’ sentiments demonstrate one perspective in a wide opinion 
spectrum about American security interests. Military researcher and author Dr. 
Doug MacGregor takes a different standpoint, believing there is consensus in the 
United States for a new national strategy “focused on protecting Americans, 
American territory, and core American commercial interests.”329 In a break from 
U.S. military trends, Dr. MacGregor argues that U.S. military funding should not 
fund stabilization missions such as “flood relief, humanitarian assistance, nation 
building, or combating Ebola.”330 Dr. MacGregor asserts that U.S. defense 
spending should only support assets whose purpose is fighting and destroying 
America’s enemies.331 
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Homeland security researchers Dr. Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby 
contend the United States needs to develop a “national strategic narrative” to 
sustain vital American security interests.332 Philosophically, they argue America 
must clarify national values to support our security interests and “achieve 
sustainable prosperity and security.”333 Their research argues that American 
foreign and domestic policies have historically favored containment and 
deterrence strategies. Dr. Porter and Mykleby advocate for a strategic shift from 
containment to sustainability through civic engagement and a renewed focus on 
vital security interests.334 While these authors come to different academic or 
political conclusions, they all support the idea that U.S. homeland security efforts 
must be based upon vital security interests. 
Stability operations strategy forces stakeholders—whether public or 
private—to determine their role in supporting security interests and objectives. 
The circumstances, setting, and political environment may each contribute to 
different conclusions about what constitutes a vital security interest. Homeland 
security and government leaders may have differing interpretations of what 
qualifies as a security interest in their areas of responsibility. 
Criminal justice reform, unemployment, neighborhood blight, or quality 
education may be viewed as a critical security interests in some jurisdictions, but 
prioritized less significantly elsewhere. Providing food, water, and basic 
necessities after a natural disaster may be a critical homeland security matter, 
but deemed less of a priority in everyday life. As evidenced in Flint, Michigan, 
taking “normal” services for granted (i.e., clean water) can suddenly erupt into a 
manmade disaster for government leaders.335 Accurately evaluating homeland 
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security interests is more art than science, and remains a challenge for leaders 
and executives without a comprehensive strategy. 
D. ANALYSIS 
Homeland security agencies, particularly non-federal entities, lack a 
comprehensive strategy to unify their prevention and response efforts. Many 
jurisdictions engage in a wide variety of initiatives and working relationships, but 
generally lack a cohesive strategy to direct these efforts toward common 
objectives. Stability operations strategy requires stakeholders to identify their 
appropriate roles in supporting community-focused objectives. 
Existing collaboration in civil-military operations and the development of 
whole community initiatives demonstrate some progress toward achieving better 
unity of effort.336 Despite some negative perceptions about civil-military 
collaboration, the DOD and other military assets offer significant logistical support 
to areas of homeland security. A more public acknowledgement of military 
support for homeland security agencies—particularly in disaster response—may 
be helpful in generating community support for such efforts. 
Military professionals have been able to use stabilization strategy and civil 
affairs forces to unify operations in numerous theaters. It is also worth noting that 
many civil affairs personnel are military reservists with civilian duties in homeland 
security fields.337 Their civilian agencies may be able to leverage their 
professional military expertise in adopting stability operations for their 
jurisdictions. The prevalence of ongoing civil-military collaboration and support 
from the DOD for homeland security operations may improve the feasibility of 
implementing stabilization strategy domestically. 
The NIMS, NRF, and whole community models have generally been 
accepted as useful collaborative models for managing response efforts. Despite 
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the prevalence of response plans, there is a lack of consensus on prevention 
methodology. The latter is likely more challenging than the former, which may 
partially account for the struggle to identify proactive, preventative solutions. 
While no single plan is likely to garner 100 percent participation or support from 
all homeland security stakeholders, community and government expectations 
signal that progress is needed. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored civil-military collaboration and homeland security 
initiatives using four major stability operations objectives: unity of effort, conflict 
transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests. The nature of 
many homeland security responsibilities aligns with these primary stabilization 
objectives. This author believes stabilization strategy does offer a useful—albeit 
broad—strategy for unifying prevention and response strategies. In fact, the 
breadth of the methodology may offer significant benefits in its ability to 
incorporate the efforts of NGOs, homeland security agencies, and community 
members. 
As noted by Dr. MacGregor, there seems to be a swell of public opinion 
supporting a national strategy focused on protecting American security 
interests.338 Homeland security agencies are being asked to assist in resolving 
long-standing societal ills through prevention initiatives. Simultaneously, the 
same agencies must be prepared to respond to crises and disasters, both 
manmade and environmental. Homeland security agencies may be most 
effective in partnering with NGOs or community groups to resolve these types of 
systemic problems. Homeland security can be strengthened by clarifying long-
term roles and allowing each stakeholder to focus on their primary mission. 
There does appear to be a demand for strategy that unifies homeland 
security prevention and response efforts. In considering alternative models, we 
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should innovate and adapt rather than invent.339 Chapter V contains several 
policy option suggestions for considering stability operations strategy and its use 
of civil affairs as a template in homeland security activities. 
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V. POLICY OPTIONS 
Our current system for homeland security does not provide the 
necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st 
Century catastrophic threats. 
—The White House, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
 
The above quote from 2006 delivered a damning assessment of the U.S. 
government response to Hurricane Katrina. In the subsequent decade, FEMA 
and other federal homeland security agencies have endeavored to improve 
comprehensive efforts to stabilize communities. As noted in Chapter IV, these 
efforts have improved disaster prevention and response methods while other 
areas of homeland security continue to utilize a variety of approaches. This 
chapter compares several options for state and local decision makers to consider 
stability operations as a possible homeland security strategy. Specifically, this 
chapter suggests an adaptation of civil affairs’ twelve principles of joint 
operations for homeland security efforts.340 This chapter also briefly explores 
policy options for organizing homeland security strategy using the primary 
stability task sectors: civil security, civil control, essential services, support to 
governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and 
information management.341 
Although this chapter does not include all possible strategic options, it 
offers alternatives for state and local homeland security officials and elected 
leaders. Option A assesses the possibility of continuing existing methods, and 
provides guidance on evaluating current efforts based upon stabilization 
principles. Option B expands the first alternative and examines how stabilization 
strategy could be implemented on a small scale. Option C incorporates the 
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benefits of the previous two choices and illustrates how the model could be 
implemented to unify regional homeland security efforts. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
The primary audience for this research is assumed to be state and local 
executives with homeland security responsibilities. The policy recommendations 
in this chapter are provided within that context, and suggest options for unifying 
efforts toward domestic stability. Politicians and civil leaders sometimes raise 
comparisons with combat by describing the “war on drugs” or defending cities 
“under siege” by violence or poverty. However, this author assumes homeland 
security and military activities share both similarities and differences. Domestic 
efforts to use stabilization strategy may face collaborative challenges similar to 
civil affairs forces, but without the benefits of armed military occupation.342  
Given the lack of consensus in strategic approaches to state and local 
homeland security, this chapter assumes another alternative may be helpful. For 
stability operations strategy to be successful, state and local homeland security 
agencies must allow significant time for planning and preparation. Regardless of 
the methodology, this author assumes each stakeholder understands his or her 
role and contribution toward shared homeland security goals. The models 
discussed in this chapter assume that objectives will be planned before 
implementation with appropriate, long-term evaluative measures identified.343 
This author does not underestimate the challenges in coordinating 
homeland security activities, and assumes the vast response capabilities inside 
the United States will continue to be scaled as needed. The proposed options are 
decidedly general to leverage the methodology’s flexibility in accommodating 
unique jurisdictional nuances. 
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B. STABILITY OPERATIONS MODEL FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
1. Option A: Maintain Current Methods
As discussed in previous chapters, there is general agreement that current 
approaches to homeland security strategy should be improved, particularly in 
U.S. law enforcement practices.344 Although disaster response plans are more 
unified, other areas of homeland security strategy lack consensus. State and 
local leaders who resist community expectations are unlikely to succeed in their 
missions, and face an uphill struggle against contemporary challenges and 
expectations. Communities increasingly express dissatisfaction with the existing 
efforts, and demand more involvement and oversight in homeland security 
matters.345 Stability operations strategy focuses on community engagement and 
identifies six primary stability task sectors, as illustrated in Figure 14. 
Figure 14.  Primary Stability Tasks 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2008), 3-19, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/
FM307/FM3-07.pdf. 
344 Police Executive Research Forum, “Use of Force.” 
345 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Ferguson, Missouri, xvii. 
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As noted in Chapter II, effective information engagement must be woven 
into other tasks to gain community support.346 Of course, some communities are 
satisfied with the performance of homeland security professionals. If homeland 
security agencies have demonstrated success in each of these six areas, 
perhaps no dramatic changes are needed. In those circumstances, the model 
could be useful comparatively, to gauge the success of existing organizational 
strategy. 
Civil affairs methodology suggests twelve principles for joint stability 
operations.347 Based on the similar goals of homeland security and stability 
operations strategy, this author believes the principles can be revised for 
homeland security efforts. If state and local homeland security agencies 
demonstrate success in these areas, maintaining current methods may be 
reasonable. As modified for homeland security, the twelve principles are:  
1. Objective: ensure stakeholders share a clearly defined and 
attainable purpose supporting primary stability tasks. 
2. Offensive: maintain the initiative toward addressing systemic 
issues. 
3. Mass: leverage the benefits of collective capability from a wider 
spectrum of resources. 
4. Economy of force: prioritize resources toward key objectives, with 
fewer assets dedicated to secondary efforts. 
5. Maneuver: shift collaborative resources to support homeland 
security objectives.  
6. Unity of Command: ensure a clearly defined organizational 
command structure for every activity. 
7. Security: focus prevention efforts on preparing for the unexpected, 
and respond to critical incidents. 
8. Surprise: be creatively proactive in efforts to protect and engage 
the public. 
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9. Simplicity: establish clear and uncomplicated stability operations 
strategy for homeland security. 
10. Perseverance: ensure practitioners have the commitment 
necessary to achieve homeland security objectives. 
11. Legitimacy: develop rapport with the community to help maintain 
stable neighborhoods. 
12. Restraint: emphasize institutional patience, and balance use of 
force with soft power strategies.348 
 
2. Option B: Small-Scale Implementation 
Consideration of this option should also include the twelve principles for 
homeland security efforts noted in Option A. Given contemporary demands for 
change in homeland security, even small-scale implementation of stabilization 
strategy is a worthwhile consideration. Small-scale implementation should not be 
confused with limiting stabilization strategy to a single stakeholder. 
For example, civil affairs forces deploy across the spectrum of conflict to 
execute stability operations strategy.349 In the United States, emergency 
management and law enforcement agencies engage in prevention and response 
activities in struggling environments across a comparable spectrum. In 
Massachusetts, the C3 Policing model narrowly applied military COIN strategies 
to law enforcement and community activities.350 Applying community-focused 
stabilization strategy into these types of agencies might seem a logical response 
to civic expectations. 
However, attempts to confine stabilization strategy in single agencies 
could leave communities vulnerable to whims and viral incidents. Collaborative 
stabilization strategy distributes responsibility among stakeholders, as evidenced 
in civil-military operations. Unity of effort and collaboration remain key objectives 
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when considering the viability of small-scale stabilization strategy 
implementation. This author believes the unifying nature of stability operations 
strategy does not support a similarly limited application. 
Given the variations in public organizations, it is possible some 
jurisdictions may find value in a gradual introduction of stabilization strategy. 
Stability operations strategy may also be implemented differently in various parts 
of the country, but is a useful consideration for urban or rural jurisdictions. The 
methodology remains community-focused, regardless of the population setting. 
The strength of application for small-scale homeland security implementation 
remains its community-focused, collaborative traits.351 Homeland security 
leaders in rural or non-metropolitan areas might utilize stability operations 
strategy as a means to improve their more modest prevention and response 
capabilities. 
Like civil affairs forces, homeland security practitioners could use stability 
operations strategy to develop collaborative relationships with utility providers, 
critical infrastructure agencies, military partners, community groups, and other 
stakeholders. The viability of cooperative efforts could be assessed based upon 
stability objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of 
law, and security interests.352 Figure 15 depicts how the U.S. military integrates 
lines of effort into support for stability operations. 
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Figure 15.  Examples of Integration in Stabilization Objectives 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, October 2008), 4-11, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf. 
Even in rural areas, public and private providers deliver the type of critical 
services illustrated in Figure 15. Many of these lines of service are essential to 
homeland security efforts, as demonstrated anecdotally by the ongoing clean 
water crisis in Flint, Michigan.353 As suggested by some researchers, a military-
style organization may not be ideal for administering post-conflict stability 
operations strategy.354 This could be challenging in jurisdictions where law 
enforcement or fire departments are the primary homeland security agencies. For 
example, consider how non-metropolitan counties might implement stabilization 
strategy. While each state has a homeland security organization, non-
metropolitan areas often have limited resources commensurate with their 
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population.355 Police and fire services may be the primary homeland security 
resources, and access varies by community. Using Figure 15 as a template, 
smaller communities could organize a small task force comprising a 
representative from each line of effort. Stability operations strategy provides a 
scalable template useful for small or larger implementation. For communities 
without collaborative partnerships, stability operations strategy offers a useful 
guide for unifying homeland security efforts. 
3. Option C: Comprehensive Regional Implementation 
Befitting its military origins, stability operations strategy is perhaps most 
ideal for metropolitan jurisdictions with access to significant resources. In the 
context of a significant regional application, homeland security responsibilities 
tend to be more specialized and distributed broadly among public and private 
organizations. A unifying strategy is needed. 
Building upon the recommendations in Options A and B, stabilization 
methodology provides flexibility for adapting to cultural distinctions and unifying 
community stakeholders in regional homeland security initiatives. Particularly in 
urban communities, there is a demand for increased transparency in homeland 
security activities.356 Figure 16 offers one suggestion for organizing community-
focused stability tasks in homeland security efforts. 
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Figure 16.  Stability Lines of Effort for Homeland Security 
 
Adapted from Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, After-Action Assessment of 
the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri (Washington, 
DC: Institute for Intergovernmental Research), xvi–xvii. 
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Figures 15 and 16 offer examples for integration of homeland security 
objectives into a stability operations strategy. While stakeholder participation may 
be voluntary or encouraged by regulation, stabilization strategy is built upon the 
premise of willing cooperation. If partnerships crumble or fail to reach 
expectations, the state of homeland security efforts may be no worse than it was 
before stabilization strategy was introduced. Stakeholders will continue to provide 
services as before. However, existing plans and new initiatives benefit from being 
integrated into an organized, comprehensive strategy. 
Metropolitan areas have existing regional homeland security 
organizations, and stability operations methodology offers a guide toward 
implementing a comprehensive yet complex strategy. Whereas the C3 Policing 
model limited COIN tactics to law enforcement applications, stabilization strategy 
offers a more inclusive, community-focused blueprint for regional homeland 
security efforts.357 Like the C3 Policing model, stabilization strategy emphasizes 
the integration of existing resources rather than duplicating current efforts. Such 
a strategy could incorporate existing local efforts such as criminal justice reform, 
public health initiatives, community engagement, and disaster preparedness. 
Regional commitments to stability operations strategy may also benefit 
from sustained trends toward greater civil-military collaboration. Earlier chapters 
discussed the DOD’s significant commitment to stability operations strategy and 
support for homeland security efforts.358 Metropolitan regions often have greater 
access to military assets, and continued civil-military collaboration may benefit 
from a shared stabilization methodology. Also, a significant number of military 
civil affairs reservists serve in civilian homeland security roles.359 Metropolitan 
agencies may unwittingly have a number of active military personnel with 
expertise in stability operations. Their military proficiency and experience may be 
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ideal for implementing the strategy in homeland security affairs, and would be 
consistent with the goal of maximizing existing resources. The regional 
implementation of stability operations strategy may offer a beneficial model to 
encourage further civil-military cooperation in domestic homeland security 
objectives. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
State and local homeland security agencies should consider the viability of 
stability operations strategy for their jurisdictions. The military model offers 
sufficient flexibility to adapt homeland security efforts while offering a framework 
to guide decision-making. Stability operations strategy provides a strategic 
blueprint for organizing homeland security efforts while incorporating community 
involvement and public/private partnerships. For leaders wishing to maintain 
current methods, the strategy may offer a useful evaluative measure for existing 
efforts. In these cases, this author suggests homeland security agencies utilize 
the twelve principles for stability adapted from civil affairs methodology. 
Previous chapters describe the historical use of stability operations 
strategy in a variety of foreign theaters. The precedent supports a scalable 
framework for homeland security leaders serving varied population densities and 
environments. Figures 15 and 16 exemplify how the strategy might be 
implemented, although other variations may be equally valid. Homeland security 
agencies would do well to consider stability operations strategy as a means to 
unify collaborative efforts in their jurisdictions. Implementing stability operations 
strategy seems preferable to the lack of consensus currently found in many 
areas of homeland security. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 
—Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Stability operations strategy has been implemented with varying degrees 
of success in extremely complex environments. The challenges facing domestic 
homeland security are no less difficult. While progress has been made in 
developing disaster response plans, there is no unifying prevention and response 
strategy in other areas of state and local homeland security. Stability operations 
strategy offers a community-focused methodology for unifying prevention and 
response efforts. In that context, this thesis set forth to answer two primary 
research questions: 
1. Is the U.S. military’s stability operations strategy a useful 
consideration for domestic homeland security applications? 
2. If so, how could military stability operations strategy be 
implemented in homeland security efforts? 
1. Stability Operations Strategy 
To investigate these queries, this thesis began by examining the U.S. 
military’s stability operations strategy. The non-traditional, decentralized 
approach is unique in military doctrine due to its focus on civilian issues.360 
Stability operations methodology evolved through centuries of American military 
history and is now prominently on par with traditional defensive and offensive 
operations.361 Modern stability operations strategy has been executed across the 
“spectrum of conflict,” using four objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, 
legitimacy and rule of law, and national security interests.362  
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While stability operations strategy has been lauded for its collaborative 
emphasis, some have suggested that military forces may not be an ideal means 
for consensus building in non-combat environments.363 These researchers 
contend such stabilization efforts should be overseen by non-military, civilian 
organizations.364 However, the U.S. military uses stability operations strategy to 
organize collaborative efforts to resolve community issues. The military 
designates six primary stability task sectors:  
1. Establish Civil Security 
2. Establish Civil Control 
3. Restore Essential Services 
4. Support Governance 
5. Support Economic and Infrastructure Development 
6. Manage Information365 
The strategy emphasizes the value of community engagement and civilian-run 
initiatives in post-combat environments.366 Perhaps most relevant to homeland 
security considerations, military methodology provides examples for organizing 
lines of effort into the six primary stability task areas.367 The sixth category—
information management—is designed to be woven throughout the other task 
sectors and support community outreach efforts. 
2. Civil Affairs 
This research also studied the use of civil affairs forces to execute stability 
operations strategy. Similar to some aspects of homeland security efforts, civil 
affairs has been referred to as “armed social work.”368 Civil affairs forces step in 
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to perform duties normally performed by civilian governments in order to restore 
regional community-led administration. 
Civil affairs forces are guided by “twelve principles of joint operations” 
during combat and non-combat actions.369 These principles provide the basis for 
civil affairs operations in unstable foreign deployments. The research noted that 
homeland security efforts function in a domestic environment that is generally 
more predictable and stable. Civil affairs units are most effective when these 
principles are used to guide successful, collaborative relationships with 
community stakeholders. The twelve principles suggest guidelines for translating 
theoretical stabilization strategies into real-world applications useful for homeland 
security. 
3. Homeland Security Initiatives 
This thesis proceeded to examine homeland security initiatives relevant to 
comparisons with stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs. U.S. 
homeland security efforts vary significantly by jurisdiction, particularly at the state 
and local levels. Homeland security leaders may find stability operations 
methodology offers a flexible framework for integrating existing initiatives and 
resources. U.S. citizens have expressed dissatisfaction with disaster response 
and law enforcement efforts. In light of demands for change, the research 
considered homeland security initiatives within the context of four stabilization 
objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and 
security interests.370 To do so, this author briefly described examples of 
cooperation between civilian and U.S. military assets in support of homeland 
security operations. The history of civil-military collaboration may be surprisingly 
extensive, including thousands of joint operations each year. Military support for 
homeland security activities is not unusual, and provides some context and 
precedent for using military stabilization strategy in domestic efforts. 
                                            
369 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), 1-10 – 1-11. 
370 Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07), 1-3. 
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Efforts to unify homeland security response capabilities have improved, 
although there remains room for improvement. FEMA’s National Preparedness 
System, National Incident Management System, and other strategies represent 
significant progress toward engaging the whole community and coordinating 
disaster response efforts. But these models understandably focus on unified 
disaster response plans rather than prevention. Recent criticisms of American 
policing may demonstrate limitations in unity of effort between law enforcement 
agencies and other collaborative partners. 
This research examined several strategies that were intended to transform 
communities decimated by disaster or crime. Much like the challenges faced by 
civil affairs forces, homeland security efforts and community expectations are 
often challenged to balance so-called “hard” and “soft” power strategies.371 While 
civil affairs strategy prefers the softer, diplomatic approach, it maintains military 
use of force as a viable option when necessary. Similarly, various efforts in 
homeland security have attempted to incorporate alternative strategies such as 
NIMS and the C3 Policing model. These methods aim to engage the community 
to identify root problems and partner in solving the related issues. Such efforts 
are designed to improve legitimacy and community sentiments about homeland 
security initiatives. Of course, many homeland security efforts—particularly those 
of law enforcement—generate a significant level of skepticism. The research 
provided several examples of suggestions for a national strategy reflecting a shift 
toward supporting domestic security interests. These criticisms are not a new 
phenomenon, but do suggest a renewed call for community-focused homeland 
security efforts. Stability operations strategy proposes such a strategy for unifying 
homeland security prevention and response efforts. 
4. Policy Options 
In light of the research findings, this thesis suggests three different policy 
options for considering stability operations strategy in the homeland security 
                                            
371 Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-10. 
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enterprise. Option A considered maintaining current methods. Generally, 
community expectations and best practices demand homeland security agencies 
continue to evolve. This author adapted civil affairs’ twelve principles of joint 
operations to suggest similar tenets for homeland security efforts. The goal was 
to allow homeland security executives and policy decision makers to use stability 
operations strategy in deciding whether or not to maintain current methods. 
Subsequent policy options built upon each preceding suggestion. Option B 
considered the implications of applying stabilization strategy on a smaller scale, 
such as in non-metropolitan areas. This section also briefly discussed the 
challenges of implementing stability operations strategy in a single agency. Non-
metropolitan areas were used as a general example to demonstrate that 
stabilization strategy could still be used to incorporate lines of effort into a 
homeland security strategy. In fact, stability operations strategy may offer a 
template for areas with limited resources to engage community partners and 
unify homeland security prevention and response capabilities. 
Lastly, Option C considered the possibility of comprehensive regional 
implementation. Given the complexities of metropolitan regions and layers of 
specialized homeland security responsibilities, a unifying strategy is needed. 
Figure 16 demonstrates how lines of effort might be integrated into regional 
homeland security efforts.372 This proposed design offers current homeland 
security organizations an alternative for incorporating existing resources toward a 
comprehensive, unified strategy. 
B. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Much more could be said on the topic of stability operations strategy in 
homeland security. This author readily acknowledges other parties could 
contribute more significantly in advancing inquiry on the subject. The lack of 
existing study on the suitability of military stabilization and civil affairs 
methodology for homeland security is curious. While there are certainly political 
                                            
372 This graphic is included in Appendix E. 
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ramifications outside the scope of this research, homeland security may be 
improved by a more public acknowledgement of past and present civil-military 
collaboration. Given decades of historical military application and the search for 
homeland security strategies, the dearth of research on the matter is a bit 
surprising. 
While this thesis does not resolve questions about what activities qualify 
as “homeland security” activities it does propose a new alternative for organizing 
existing and future efforts within a unified framework. For example, the DHS has 
determined that climate change is a key homeland security threat.373 This 
research does not settle debates about the efficacy of such threat prioritizations. 
However, stability operations strategy does offer a flexible model for agencies to 
organize their own strategic prevention and response efforts in accordance within 
defined stabilization objectives. 
In fact, utilizing stability operations strategy may force agencies to identify 
their organizational objectives and roles within the six stability task sectors. The 
stabilization approach encourages homeland security agencies to stop, 
collaborate, and listen to community stakeholders. This may be a new 
experience for some homeland agencies, but is a reasonable response to 
contemporary demands for transparency. In the event a proposal does not fit into 
a specific stability task sector, it may indicate an effort is outside the scope of 
homeland security activities.  
Based upon the research, some criticisms of homeland security efforts 
could be appeased with successful adaptation of stability operations strategy. In 
broad terms, stabilization strategy may help homeland security practitioners:  
Clarify the homeland security mission—focus on community. 
Connect strategic vision (community) to operational initiatives. 
Improve coordination of resources through unity of effort. 
                                            
373 Lisa Anderson, “US Homeland Security Moves to Tackle Climate Change Risks,” 
Reuters, September 25, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-climate-security-
idUSKCN0HK2PW20140925.  
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Prepare a response plan for success, inaction, or failure. 
Learn from mistakes—no plan is perfect. 
Identify community expectations and measures of performance. 
Evaluate efforts.374 
Future research opportunities could explore the operational and organizational 
implications in any of these areas. One of the most appealing qualities about 
stabilization strategy is its flexibility to adapt to cultural and regional nuances. 
This author debated the merits of using a specific agency as a hypothetical 
example for implementing stability operations strategy. After much consideration, 
this activity seemed limited primarily to those who would be familiar with that 
specific agency. In the end, it seemed more prudent to allow readers to apply the 
strategy to their own professions. 
At the conclusion of this research, there remains much opportunity for 
additional study. Subsequent research may find value in approaching stability 
operations from an operational or organizational approach rather than strategic. 
Stability operations strategy could be studied from a variety of other 
perspectives—public/private partnerships, community engagement, legitimacy in 
homeland security, or military defense support of civil authorities. This last idea is 
perhaps most intriguing, as reflected by the attention it was given. Examples of 
military activity and collaboration provide some basis for precedent, and the 
subject matter would benefit from additional study. 
Given the U.S. military’s strategic commitment to homeland security 
operations, practitioners may be well served by a detailed analysis of 
opportunities for cooperation between military resources and their own agencies. 
These types of partnerships already exist in disaster response and other areas of 
homeland security. The commonalities between stability operations and 
homeland security strategies are worth exploring further. Expanding these efforts 
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Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57); Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation (JDP 3-40). 
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toward a shared strategic methodology seems a logical progression. Particularly 
given trends toward continued civil-military collaboration, stability operations 
strategy remains a viable topic for future homeland security research. 
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APPENDIX A.  CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
 
Although this graphic depicts some functional civil affairs capabilities, the Army field manual 
provides a more extensive blueprint for organizing civil affairs activities. Source: Department of 
the Army, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
October 2011), 1-7, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.  
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APPENDIX C.  COMMUNITY POLICING VERSUS C3 POLICING 
 
Source: Massachusetts State Police, accessed March 19, 2016, http://i1.wp.com/
mspc3policing.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/difference1.jpg?w=960. 
 116 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 117 
APPENDIX D.  STABILITY OPERATIONS LINES OF EFFORT 
 
Source: Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.  
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APPENDIX E.  STABILITY LINES OF EFFORT FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
 
Adapted from Department of the Army, Stability Operations (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/
FM3-07.pdf. 
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